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ABSTRACT
In 1961 the Thai government's first National Economic and Social Development Plan
identified automobile assembly as a critical industry for ensuring the successful economic
and social development of Thailand. Over the last 37 years Thailand has focused almost
exclusively on economic development, and as a result it is now one of the most powerful
economies in Southeast Asia. During this period, Thailand's economy has grown
considerably and the nation has emerged as the regional leader in automotive technology
and automobile production. Unfortunately, the accompanying increase in automobile
ownership has plagued the capital and primary city of Bangkok with severe traffic
congestion and air pollution, each of which are considered to be among the worst in the
world. As a result, motor vehicles appear to have, at least partially, had adverse effects on
the economic development and quality of life that the automobile industry was originally
intended to bring to the people of Thailand. This thesis focuses on developing an
integrated, comprehensive strategy that the Thai government could use to pursue a more
balanced form of sustainable economic development through the reconciliation of the
economic development potential of a strong automobile industry with the motor vehicle
related urban problems of traffic congestion and air pollution.
Thesis Supervisor: David H. Marks
Title: Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering
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1. Mobility, Pollution, and Economic Development
1.1 Introduction
In 1961, Thailand adopted its first National Economic and Social Development Plan which
was intended to direct government policy towards the goal of economic development through
1966. Under this original plan and seven subsequent five-year plans, Thailand's economy has
grown at an average rate of 7.8% per year, its annual population growth rate has fallen from 3.4 to
1.2% per year, and per capita income has grown from 2,100 to 68,000 Baht' per year (Wanisubut,
1998, p).2-3). By 1995, Thailand had become the 30th largest economy in the world and was
considered to be one of Asia's 'tiger' economies. This growth was severely interrupted in early
1997, however, when several sectors of the Thai economy collapsed following the Thai central
bank's near default2 on short-term foreign loans amounting to nearly one-third of GDP. By the
end of 1997, the Baht had lost 40% of its value, the Thai stock market had plunged 65%, and the
national GDP had shrunk by nearly 1% (Economist, 1998, p. 5).
While financial experts are hopeful that Thailand's economy will recover, they believe that
long-term growth and stability will require Thailand to correct many of the fundamental problems
which were either unknown or ignored when the economy was booming. These observations are
not limited to the financial sectors alone however. There were and still are many other problems in
Thailand that were either ignored or simply assumed to be inherent in 'doing business in Thailand.'
Of these problems, one of the most severe is the country's lack of mobility in general, but
especially in Bangkok which is known to have among the worst traffic congestion in the world.
Aside from the inconvenience and decline in the quality of life for the citizens of Bangkok, traffic
The Baht is basic unit of Thai currency. For much of the early 1990s, US $1 was equal to roughly 25 Baht.
2 Prior to The Bank of Thailand defaulting on these loans, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provided US $11
billion in loans in exchange for Thailand completing significant reforms in its investment and banking policies.
congestion restricts the movement and transport of goods, services, and people which is essential
to a functioning economy. By failing to provide such mobility, the economic cost of Bangkok's
congestion has been estimated at one-third of the potential gross city product (Strickland, 1993,
p.4). Unfortunately, the effects of traffic congestion extend even further because the average car in
Bangkok spends the equivalent of 44 days each year motionless in traffic jams, yet each of these
cars continuously emit air pollutants into the highly-developed, densely-populated streets of
Bangkok (Strickland, 1993, p.4). The result is severe urban air pollution which threatens the
public health and lowers the quality of life of Bangkok residents while at the same time imposing
additional direct, indirect, and opportunity costs on the economy, business, and individuals.
On the surface it seems that Bangkok's congestion and poor air quality are the result of too
many automobiles and too few roads and highways. However, a deeper analysis suggests that
Bangkok's causes are more complex than just cars and roads, but also that the fundamental
problem may be have a rather simple 'theoretical' answer. To shed a bit of light on the additional
complexities, one of the most influential causes of Bangkok's traffic congestion and air pollution
problems lies in its own history. This is because as the city of Bangkok developed, its formerly
agrarian layout has been transformed into a massive urban sprawl which extends for more than 50
kilometers in all directions and which is highly incompatible with efficient roadway systems
(Strickland, 1993, p.1). During this rapid growth, however, adequate public transportation was
never established thereby forcing Bangkok's citizens to turn to motor vehicles to meet their
growing need for mobility. In light of this more comprehensive examination, it seems that the
cause of Bangkok's traffic congestion and air pollution is not motor vehicles per se, but the lack of
viable transportation alternatives (BMA/MIT, 1995, p.3).
This finding is reassuring because it suggests that motor vehicles will continue to play an
important role in Thailand and even in Bangkok, but more importantly it reaffirms the Thai
government's long-standing policy of encouraging the development of a domestic automobile
industry. As part of the 1961 National Economic and Social Development Plan, the Thai
government identified the 'automobile assembly' industry as a preferred industry to bring to
Thailand to further economic development, and with it, improved quality of life for all Thais. Over
the past 37 years, Thailand has remained steadfast in its commitment to the automobile industry
and extended its policy to include significant investment incentives to related parts and support
industries. As a result of these and more recent policy changes aimed at distributing industrial
production throughout Thailand as well as producing a strong export market for both automobiles
and automotive parts, Thailand now has a globally competitive industry which it hopes will further
economic development and the attendant increase in quality of life for all Thais.
At the same time, however, the government must address the fact that automobiles are
hindering economic development and eroding the quality of life within Bangkok itself. As
previously explained, the underlying problem is not automobiles per se, but providing viable
transportation alternatives. However, developing and implementing such alternatives is a long-
term process and, even if successful, will not eliminate the problems of traffic congestion and air
pollution. For this reason, the government must begin to develop an understanding of how
mobility, air pollution and public health interact with the automobile and its related industries, as
well as the government's own ability to manage and guide these interrelationships.
It is within this context that this thesis focuses on developing an integrated and
comprehensive strategy that could potentially be used by the Thai government to pursue a more
balanced form of sustainable economic development, made possible by reconciling the economic
development potential of a strong automobile industry with the urban problems of traffic
congestion and air pollution which are present in Bangkok.
1.2 Developing a Solution
The first step towards developing a solution begins with obtaining a sufficient
understanding of Thailand's physical, political, and socioeconomic background, the development
and significance of the automotive industry, as well as the current economic conditions which are
affecting Thailand at the moment (Chapter 2). Next, it is important to understand the
environmental impacts of motor vehicles on Thailand and particularly Bangkok and its citizens.
This information is critical to understanding the urgency of Thailand's pollution problems, the
unsustainable nature of "business as usual" (Chapter 3). It is then beneficial to explore the
challenges, tradeoffs, and opportunities which are inherent in balancing mobility, air pollution,
emissions control technologies, the economic development potential of the automobile industry as
well as the capacity of the government to effectively and efficiently manage all of these concerns.
Developing this level of understanding is best accomplished by describing the status quo,
highlighting the inherent tradeoffs, and revealing likely future demands and opportunities (Chapter
4). Finally, recommendations for a sample comprehensive, integrated strategy are presented in the
form of goals and tactics which are intended to guide Thailand toward a more balanced form of
sustainable economic development--made possible by balancing and managing the economic
development potential of a strong automobile industry with the urban problems of traffic
congestion and air pollution which are present in Bangkok (Chapter 5).
1.3 Overview of Findings
Based on the broad-based review contained in this thesis there are numerous opportunities
for improvements in the status quo. Some of these are small and easily attainable, but others are
more significant and much more difficult to accomplish. Most importantly, however, numerous
opportunities were identified where Thailand can direct the automobile industry towards new areas
and markets which will continue to provide growing economic opportunities, while at the same
time increasing efficiency, sustainability, as well as the health, quality of life, and desirability of
living in Bangkok.
The following recommendations provide a strong foundation for a new integrated, national
strategy for balancing the economic development potential of the automotive industry against the
urban environmental problems of air pollution and traffic congestion.
*Mobility to should be provided for all socioeconomic groups.
*Government should focus be on moving people and and not vehicles (Vongpivat, 1998a).
*Encourage private sector participation in the provision of public transportation (both bus and rapid
transit).
*Increase the usage of public mass transit in Bangkok through a vastly improved bus system
which includes additional designated bus lanes and additional, and cleaner buses.
*Increase government willingness to subsidize mass rapid transit.
*Use infrastructure to guide development into sustainable urban forms (including both mass transit
and roads).
*Increase the cost of driving by appropriate taxes to maker mass transit more attractive, reduce
externalities of private automobile use, raise revenues for public transit.
eAll vehicles should well maintained over the course of their life to ensure low emissions.
*Encourage further development of two-stroke motorcycle catalyst technology and industry.
*Encourage alternative fuel vehicle research.
*Provide safe ambient air quality throughout all of Thailand.
*Do not adopt excessively stringent emissions standards.
*Promote cooperative educational ventures between industry and government.
*Encourage the harmonization of regional and global standards.
2. Background
Before one can begin to contemplate the interrelationship between mobility, pollution, and
economic development in Thailand, one must develop an understanding of the country itself in
terms of its basic geography, politics, government, history, and economy. In addition, one must
understand the history of the development of Thailand's automotive industry, the industry's recent
growth, how it has been affected by the economic crisis that has spread throughout all of Southeast
Asia.
2.1 General Information
2.1.1 Physical Profile
Thailand is located midway between China and India, thereby positioning Thailand almost
exactly in the center of Southeast Asia. It is bordered by Myanmar to the north and west, Laos to
the northeast, Cambodia to the east, and Malaysia to the south. Thailand's southwestern coast
abuts the Andaman Sea, and its southeastern coast borders the Gulf of Thailand (See Figure 2.1).
Thailand's total area is 518,000 sq km or 180,000 sq mi (roughly the size of France) which can be
divided into roughly six different regions. (See Figure 2.2). These regions are as follows (Levy
& McCarthy, 1994, p.1-2; Phantumvanit & Sathirathai, 1988, p.11-13):
* North: Northern Thailand is very mountainous and forms the foothills of the
Himalayas. It is also the location of forestry, mining, and farming.
* Northeast Plateau: Relatively infertile, this is the least developed region in Thailand. It
is bordered by the Mae Khlong River on the north and northeast boundaries, separating
it from Laos. Other than potash mining and subsistence farming, there is little
economic development, although the government has made efforts to shift industry to
this region.
* Central Plain: Blessed by the Chao Phraya River, this region is extremely fertile and is
home to the Thailand's massive rice crop. This region is also home to Bangkok which
is the capital and the largest city in Thailand as well as Southeast Asia.
* Southeast Coast: The southeast coast is home to numerous seaside resorts, sapphire
and ruby mines in the mountains to the east, and natural gas deposits off the coast.
* West: To the west of Bangkok are mountains and valleys as well as the River Kwai.
* Southern Peninsula: This long narrow peninsula extends to the Malaysian border and
separates the Andaman Sea and the Gulf of Thailand. This is Thailand's most tropical
region and it receives heavy rains during the monsoon season. Major industries include
tourism (numerous resorts which are popular during the dry season), mining, rubber
production, and fishing.
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2.1.2 Political Profile
The nation which came to be known as Siam was founded in 1238 AD by the unification of
the three separate Thai kingdoms which had coordinated their military efforts to repel the armies of
Kublai Khan and the Khmer empire located to the east. In 1939, the country changed its name to
the Kingdom of Thailand so that it could more easily break from tradition and move toward a more
dynamic future. Translated literally, Thailand means "Land of the Free" which reflects the fact that
Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia which was never colonized or conquered by another
nation since its founding in the 13th century. Due to their history of protecting their nation and
lands, the people of Thailand take great pride in their self-reliance and fierce independence. (Levy
and McCarthy, 1994, p.1).
Modem Thailand is shaped by the combination of a democratic constitutional monarchy; an
assertive military; an officially powerless but highly respected, influential, and benevolent King; as
well as the Buddhist religion which is followed by 95% of the population. In general, the national
government is parliamentary in form and it has recently been headed fragile five and six party
coalitions. Administrative power is firmly centralized in a series of ministries which distribute
resources and services through representatives to the 73 provinces located throughout Thailand.
As a result of the ministry coordinated distribution of resources and services, city and provincial
governments play a limited role in directing their own development and future. The only exception
to this nationally-directed, provincial development program is the capital of Bangkok. Within
Bangkok, most of the city's programs and services are managed and coordinated by the Bangkok
Metropolitan Administration (BMA), but even these actions frequently require the approval of the
national government (Potter, 1994, p.54). In light of recent cases of government corruption and
the interventionist military, it is important to stress that King Bhumibol Adulyadej3 and the Royal
family provide a sense of continuity and reason to the nation's governance.
2.1.3 Socioeconomic Profile
In 1996, Thailand's population was estimated to be roughly 60 million people, 11 million
of which lived in the Bangkok metropolitan area. Approximately 75% of the population are
ethnically Thai, 11% Chinese, 3.5% Malay, with the remainder consisting of Mon, Khmer,
Phuan, and Karen minorities. The age distribution is slanted toward the young with 29% of the
population under 15 years of age, 66% between 15 and 64, and 6% over 65 years of age. Life
expectancy in Thailand is 65 years for males and 72 years for females.
Throughout the 1980's and early 1990's the economy grew at an average annual rate of
roughly nine percent, and in 1995 the country's GDP was more than US $400 billion which
ranked it as the 30th largest economy in the world. While this growth was occurring, Thailand
also began to shift away from agriculture and transformed its industrial and process sectors from
basic assembly and food processing toward higher technology engineering, manufacturing, and
chemical processes such as electronics, fabricated metals, and the basic chemical industries (Potter,
1994, p.52). Figure 2.3 provides a time series illustration of how different sectors the Thai
economy have evolved between 1990 and 1994. In addition, Figure 2.4 shows the relative
contribution of these various sectors to Thai economy in 1994.
3 King Bhumibol Adulyadej recently celebrated the 50th anniversary of his accession to the throne. He became King
on June 9, 1946 at the age of 19.
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Sectoral Contributions to 1994 GDP
Aggregate GDP=US $110 Billion
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Figure 2.4: Sectoral Contributions to 1994 GDP (Euromonitor, 1998, Table 15.17).
Over the last twenty year, much of Thailand's growth occurred in the industrial and service
sectors, and as a result the traditionally agrarian population began to move toward the rapidly
industrializing Bangkok metropolitan area in search of higher paying jobs. As a result, Bangkok
now has roughly one-fifth of the population but more than 50% of the national GDP. As Table 2.1
illustrates, the discrepancy in income between Bangkok and the other regions of Thailand still
exists today and is more than double the national average. For this reason, there is a continued
migration into Bangkok from the surrounding areas despite government efforts which began in the
mid-1970s to channel urbanization into growing satellite cities and industrial parks outside of the
greater Bangkok area. (Potter, 1994)
Region Average Yearly Income Average Yearly Income
per Household (US $) per Person (US $)
Whole Kingdom $3,980 $1,047
Greater Bangkok 7,909 2,397
Central Region 4,196 1,134
Northern Region 2,996 856
Northeastern Region 2,718 663
Southern Region 3,856 940
Table 2.1: Average Yearly Income by Region 1994 (Euromonitor, 1998, Table 15.45).
2.2 Development of the Thai Automotive Industry
2.2.1 Pre-1990: Creation, Protectionism, Liberalization
In 1961 the Thai government adopted the first National Economic & Social Development
Plan. This plan represented the government's first official strategy for furthering Thailand's
economic growth and improving the quality of life for all Thai citizens. One component of this
plan was a policy of encouraging and providing economic incentives for the development of a
private sector4 domestic automobile assembly industry. (Phasukavanich, 1998, p. 1).
The economic incentives extended to automobile assemblers included a five-year corporate
income tax exemption and a five-year 50% reduction on import duties for disassembled autos
('completely knocked down' automobiles or CKD units). By reducing the import duties on CKD
units, this legislation sent a clear message to the world's automobile assemblers that 1) Thailand
wanted to develop an automobile industry and 2) it wanted to build the industry from the top-down
by beginning with the domestic assembly of automobiles from imported parts. In addition, the
substantial economic incentive of a five-year corporate income tax exemption assured potential
4 Thailand's focus on attracting private sector industry is unique relative to its primary competitors, Malaysia and
Indonesia, focus on a public national motor vehicle industry (SAE, 1998b).
investors that the government was committed to developing a private sector automotive industry
over the long-term, but they were going to do it in stages so as to reduce risk to potential investors.
With this in mind, the government's first step was to encourage private sector investment in
domestic assembly plants which would assemble vehicles ('completely built up' automobiles or
CBU units) from imported parts (CKD units) and then sell them domestically. This new
government policy was an immediate success when in 1961 Anglo-Thai Motors, a partnership
between Ford Motor Company and a Thai company, became Thailand's first vehicle assembly
operation. In the next four years Toyota, Nissan, Fiat, and one other company also opened
assembly operations in Thailand. (SAE, 1998b)
Six years later, in 1967, the Thai government gave a boost to domestic assemblers by
increasing the import duty on CBU units to 60% and further reducing the import duties on CKD
units as follows: import duties for CKD cars were reduced by an additional 30%, CKD trucks by
an additional 20%, and CKD heavy trucks by an additional 10%. (SAE, 1998b-CHECK
LANGUAGE). By raising the price of imported vehicles at the same time they lowered the price
of domestically assembled vehicles, the Thai government made domestic automobile assembly
more lucrative to investors. As a result, several large Thai industrial corporations including Siam
Cement Group and Siam Iron and Steel soon entered the vehicle assembly market. By 1977
Thailand's assemblers had expanded to include General Motors, BMW, Peugeot, Citroen, Volvo,
and Mazda. (SAE, 1998b).
In the late 1970s, the government took its next step towards a complete automobile industry
by extending similar economic incentives and investment privileges to the any company which
would begin manufacturing automobile engines within Thailand subject to strict criteria set by the
government. Numerous companies applied for these incentives and privileges, but only a few
received them due to failing to meet the government's criteria. Nevertheless, most of these
companies opened, thereby giving creating Thailand's automotive parts industry (Vongpivat,
1998a).
In order to assure a market for Thailand's new fledgling domestic automotive parts
industry, the government soon passed local content laws which required that all automobiles
assembled in Thailand be composed of a minimum percentage of domestically manufactured parts.
Initially these content laws were set very low, but as the Thai automotive parts industry grew
(largely due to the requirements themselves), the percentages increased several times.
Unfortunately, as successful as these policies were at creating a domestic parts industry, not all
assemblers were willing to subscribe by these laws and as a result Ford, GM, and Fiat all closed
their assembly plants in Thailand. (SAE, 1998b).
In 1978 Thailand found itself in the midst of both an energy crisis and a recession. As a
result, the government sought to protect the existing domestic automobile assemblers and parts
manufacturers during this time of heightened vulnerability. This was accomplished by a
comprehensive set of policies which included prohibiting the establishment of new automobile
assembly plants, banning the import of CBU passenger cars, increasing import duties on CKD
units to between 50 and 80%, and raising the local parts content requirements even further (SAE,
1998b; Sukondhasingha, 1998).
By closing the market to new domestic assemblers and imported automobiles while at the
same time requiring higher local content and increasing the cost of imported parts, the government
had largely closed Thailand's market to the rest of the world. While this inevitably increased the
percentage of the market held by Thai industry, these acts also lessened the competitive pressures
which had forced the industry to keep costs low.
In 1984 the government, perhaps in an effort to begin reversing the course set in 1978,
attempted to promote economies of scale within the domestic industry by reducing the number of
approved passenger car series from 84 to 42. Similar rules were also adopted for the blossoming
pickup truck market5 in order to prevent fragmentation among the assembly and manufacturing
sectors. In addition, by 1986 an additional increase in local content laws brought domestic content
requirements to 54% for passenger cars and 63% for commercial vehicles.
As a result of Thailand's new policies which favored domestic production as well as a
strong yen, the major Japanese manufacturers began shifting their Japan-based, Thai export-
oriented parts manufacturing and assembly facilities directly to Thailand for domestic
manufacturing and assembly. This helped to increase Japanese profits by significantly reducing
import costs as well as utilizing lower wage rates and land costs that existed in Thailand relative
Japan. Specific investments by Japanese manufacturers included the opening of engine
manufacturing facilities for pickup trucks by Toyota, Nissan, Isuzu, and Mitsubishi opened
domestic as well as new factories for the assembly of Honda's Civic and Accord models (SAE,
1998b).
In 1988 the government abolished its import ban on passenger cars with engines larger than
2300 cc but replaced it with a 300% duty, which together with appropriate taxes, increased the cost
of such vehicles by roughly 600% (see Table 2.2).
Near the end of the 1980s, the government began to consider redirecting the Thai
automobile industry's domestic focus towards the much larger export market. However, the
government quickly realized that Thai industry, and especially the automotive parts industry, was
not capable of competing in the global market place. This was recognized to be the result of
Thailand's highly protected and closed market. The high import duties and other taxes had greatly
reduced competition with other countries as well as within Thailand itself. As a result, domestic
manufacturers had not acquired new technology or expertise and as a result, domestically produced
automobiles had low quality and high prices.
5 Pickup trucks were rapidly becoming the largest segment of automotive sales due to their much lower cost relative
to other vehicles (see Table 2.2 for import duties and total taxes) as well as their dual-use as both personal and
business vehicles.
In 1991, the government replaced its policy of protection with one of liberalization. This
change was the result of the desire to 1) force the domestic automobile and parts industries to
become more efficient, lower costs, and become globally competitive; 2) create a more lucrative,
export-oriented national policy which would attract additional foreign investment; and 3) provide
Thai consumers with more and better choices than what was currently provided by the non-
competitive, Japanese-dominated industry (Sukondhasingha, 1998; Vongpivat, 1998a). The
primary means of accomplishing these changes were removing barriers to competition, simplifying
import and export procedures, providing larger economic incentives to industry, and most
importantly, radically restructuring import duties to restore 'fairly competitive' global competition
between CBUs and CKDs (see Table 2.2). In addition, the government announced that it would
begin to consider reducing or eliminating local parts requirements. (SAE, 1998c, p.2-3;). These
policy changes quickly resulted in a flood of imported vehicles into Thailand, but more
importantly, it forced domestic manufacturers to lower their prices by 15-20% for passenger cars
and 2-4% for pickup trucks (which were already much cheaper). (Vongpivat, 1998a)
Pre-1990 'Protectionist' Policies Post-1991 'Liberalized' Import Policies
Vehicle Type Import Duty Effective Tax (Duty + Tax) Import Duty I Effective Tax (Duty + Tax)
Passenger car,
engine >2300 cc
Petrol/Gasoline
CBU 300% 617% 100% 211%
CKD 112 125 20 106
Diesel
CBU 180 696 100 211
CKD 112 170 20 106
Passenger car,
engine <2300 cc i
Petrol/Gasoline i i_
CBU 180 411 60 138
CKD 112 125 20 88
Diesel _ ___
CBU 180 457 _60 138
CKD 112 170 20 88
Pickup trucks and vans
CBU 120 159 60 98
CKD 72-94 38-43 20 26
Trucks
CBU 40 58.02 40 57.46
Note: All duties and taxes are % of actual value.
Table 2.2: Comparison of Import Duties and Effective Taxes Before and After 1991
(Vongpivat, 1998a, p.13-14).
The following year, the government adopted its first significant environmental legislation.
Part of the legislation required that all new passenger cars sold in Thailand include catalytic
converts in order to reduce emissions of CO and NOx6 . This requirement was also likely
supported by public health concerns about lead as well as the recognition that emissions control
equipment would be required in many parts of the global market. (Sukondhasingha, 1998;
Phasukavanich, 1998).
Two years later, in 1994, the Board of Investment decided to offer further incentives to
make Thailand more attractive as a base for automobile export in Southeast Asia. To do this, they
provided incentives for expanding existing production facilities as well as the construction of new
facilities for both automobile assembly and the supporting parts industry. The specific package
6 By 1991, Thailand was in its third year of a leaded fuel phase-out program. The program was completed in 1995
by which leaded fuel had been completely banned.
included an 8-yr corporate income tax exemption, elimination of import duties on all imported
manufacturing equipment, and provision for foreigners to hold all the shares in an export-oriented
project. (BOI, 1997).
Within the last several years, the government has continued to demonstrate its commitment
to liberalizing the Thai automobile industry in order to facilitate a strong export-industry. The most
significant development is that the government will eliminate all local parts content requirements as
of July 1, 1998 (Phasukavanich, 1998). In addition, other export-oriented announcements include
government assurances that it will continue to reduce industrial protections in accordance with
WTO and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) requirements (Phasukavanich, 1998). Another
promising development behind speeding government reform is that elected officials have begun to
suggest that the Thai automotive parts industry should become the regional production base for all
of Asia as other countries begin assembling vehicles domestically (BOI, 1995).
As a result of these changes, by the mid-1990s, as production neared 600,000 unit/year,
there were roughly 2,000 Thai parts manufacturing companies in Thailand which employed more
than 100,000 workers. Together these companies provided roughly 70% of all part components
for domestic assemblers even though local parts requirements were 54%, 60%, and 72% for
passenger cars, petrol pickup trucks, and diesel pickup trucks, respectively (SAE, 1998b;
Sutabutr, 1998, p.1).
Based on almost 40 years of experience, it is clear that Thailand's automotive history is
both rich and that the government is singularly committed to developing strong domestic private-
sector assembly and parts industries. In addition, the government has demonstrated that it is
committed to open markets and an increasingly global, export-oriented industry which
simultaneously provides Thai citizens with high quality and low prices.
2.2.2 Market Trends in the mid-1990s
During the mid-1980s, Thailand's economic boom had finally produced a middle class able
to afford purchasing an automobile. The first evidence of this occurred in 1987 when automobile
sales increased by 23%, 46% in 1988, 22% in 1989, and 38% in 1990 (SAE, 1998b). This trend
continued into the 1990's as shown by the increasing annual sales of passenger cars and
commercial vehicles in Figure 2.5. Substantially more impressive, however, is the increase in
registered vehicles, including motorcycles and all other forms of motor vehicles, in Bangkok and
particularly throughout Thailand. This information for the period 1987 to 1994 is shown in Figure
2.6.
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Figure 2.5: Domestic Vehicle Sales 1990-94 (Euromonitor, 1996, Table 15.47).
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Figure 2.6: Annual new vehicle registration by location 1987-1995 (Department of Land
Transport as cited in Vongpivat, 1998a, p. 17).
As impressive as the growth in sales and registrations were, Thailand's sales represented
just over half of the larger Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) market which had
regional sales in excess of 1.17 million vehicles in 1996 (AP, 1/19/98). As ASEAN demand
grew, Thai manufacturers began to make inroads into this market through its increasingly
competitive assemblers and parts manufacturers. Between 1992 and 1993 Thai manufacturers
more than doubled exports to 12,000 vehicles which were shipped to countries throughout
ASEAN, Pakistan, and the Middle East. By 1995 total Thai production approached 600,000
vehicles and exports had surpassed US $1 billion (Automotive Industry News, 1995). And even
more promising was the long-term future which, according to Ford Motor Company Executive
Vice President W. Wayne Booker, should see a ten million unit per year increase in global demand
for automobiles by 2007, with most of that growth occurring in Asia (Taylor, 3/17/97).
2.2.3 Assemblers Invest in Increased Capacity
Based on these market trends, nearly 30 years of sustained regional growth, and the
realization that the ASEAN market consists of 350 million people with a current person-to-vehicle
ratio of 25:1 (the US ratio is roughly 2:1), analysts projected that annual demand for Thai
automobiles would approach 1 million vehicles by 2000 (Associated Press, 1/19/98). In light of
these large projections, Japanese manufacturers began a flurry of new investments in Thai
production facilities so that they would be able to meet the anticipated demand within Thailand as
well as increase exports to the growing ASEAN market.
In the early 1990's, Honda Motor Company led the charge by announcing the construction
of its second Thai plant which would cost US $100M and begin production in April, 1995. The
plant would be located to the north of Bangkok and would produce the Honda City, Honda's first
"completely Asian car" assembled outside of Japan. This factory would have an initial production
capacity of 60,000 vehicles/year which would bring Honda's total Thai production capacity to
80,000 vehicles/year (Automotive Industry News, 1995; Taylor, 3/17/97).
Shortly after Honda's announcement, the other major Japanese manufacturers announced
similar expansions. Specifically, Nissan decided to increase production at its Thai plant by 50% to
140,000 cars and trucks per year. Mitsubishi announced it would relocate its pickup truck
assembly operations from Japan to Thailand's eastern seaboard. And finally, Toyota announced it
would build its second assembly plant at a cost of $350 million to boost its Thai production
capacity to 200,000 vehicles/year (Taylor, 3/17/97).
In 1996, after several years of researching market conditions and negotiating terms with
several Southeast Asian nations, the three major US automobile manufacturers each followed suit
and independently announced plans to produce automobiles in Thailand. Ford Motor Company led
the way in 1996 by declaring Thailand its regional headquarters which entitles Ford to additional
economic privileges under the Thai Board of Investment. As part of this move, Ford chose a site
along the southeast coast which would be home to a new US $500 million complex including a
pickup truck7 assembly plant as well as two comprehensive component supplier facilities. This
plant was planned to open in March, 1998 with a production capacity of 135,000 vehicles/year
(which would consists 100,000 CBUs to be sold domestically; 20,000 CBUs to be exported; and
another 35,000 CKD units for export). Ford also announced plans to open a second plant in 1999
which would focus on a new small car designed for the Asian market (Taylor, 3/17/97;
Automotive Industry News, 1995). Shortly after Ford's announcement, General Motors
announced that it would build a US $750 million assembly plant adjacent to Ford's complex on the
southeast coast. The plant would produce a version of the subcompact Opel Astra and have an
initial 100,000 unit production capacity which could be expanded to 150,000/year. Lastly,
Chrysler also announced that it would begin producing automobiles in Thailand, but at the much
smaller scale of 3,000 vehicles/year instead opting to continue to import vehicles into Thailand
from the US. (Taylor, 3/17/97).
Based on these investments by Japanese and US automobile makers it is clear that Thailand
has become the defacto automobile production center for Southeast Asia, and quite possibly the
doorway to entering the Asian market including the large, but currently less mature markets of
India and China.
2.3 Economic Collapse & Industry Response
2.3.1 Collapse of the East Asian Miracle
In early 1997, Thailand's economy collapsed when the Bank of Thailand (the Thai central
bank) nearly defaulted on foreign short-term loans equivalent to one-third of its annual GDP.
These loans had been needed as a result of significant over-investment in the Thai stock market and
real estate (largely financed through an inefficient, poorly regulated banking system) rather than
7Pickup trucks represent 60% of all new vehicles sales in Thailand (SAE, 1998b).
based on more productive sectors based on production augmentation and domestic employment
(Economist, 3/7/98, p.6; Vongpivat, 1998a, p.3) As the extent of Thailand's economic problems
became clear, individual investors began to withdraw their money before the Baht devalued. This
resulted in a massive outflow of Thailand's capital just as the short-term foreign loans the Bank of
Thailand had been using to sustain the economy came due (The Economist: SEA, 3/7/98, p.6).
As investors throughout Southeast Asia became wary over Thailand's problems, they
began to inspect the banking and monetary practices of their own institutions and found many of
the same problems. As a result, a similar outflow of capital began for most of Southeast Asia.
Overall, these events led to an economic downturn which spread rapidly through the increasingly
interconnected economies of Southeast Asia in 1997.
Fortunately, this regional collapse seems to have stabilized due to a quick and focused $16
billion bailout organized by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), a newly elected (November
1997) government which is committed to financial reform, and demonstrated progress including
the closing of more than half the country's finance companies, new banking regulations, opening
the economy to further foreign ownership, and improved financial transparency rules (Pollack,
8/11/97).
Despite the quick actions of the IMF and the ongoing reforms, many experts are predicting
that conditions will get worse in 1998 as reforms continue, bankrupt companies are forced to
close, people lose their jobs, and finally, confidence begins to be re-established in the Thai
economy. Nevertheless, beginning in 1999 experts believe the Thai economy should be on its way
to recovery. Unfortunately, the degree to which this is true is largely dependent on how two of the
regions' most important economies fare during the coming months. The first is Japan, the region's
most powerful economy, which is just beginning to reform its seriously flawed banking practices.
The second country of concern is Indonesia which currently stands on the brink of revolution. As
the fourth most populous country in the world (over 200 million people), Indonesia has a
substantial effect on the ASEAN economy. Despite these uncertainties as well as the demonstrated
economic interconnectednes of Southeast Asia, the reforms which are already in place in Thailand
should reduce the effects of these crises should they occur.
2.3.2 Impacts on the Automotive Industry
In 1996, Thai automobile production reached an all-time high of 589,126 vehicles. This
represented just over half of the total ASEAN vehicle production of 1.17 million vehicles.
Moreover, analysts projected that Thai sales would exceed 1 million vehicles by 2000. However,
as a result of the economic downturn which began in Thailand and spread steadily throughout
Southeast Asia, 1997 Thai auto sales fell 38% from 1996 levels to 363,156 units (AP, 1/19/98).
More specifically, commercial vehicle sales fell by 44.5% to 231,000. Passenger car sales
fell by 23.5% to 132,000. And 1-ton pickup sales fell by 42.5% to 188,000 (AP, 1/19/98). The
worst hit company was Nissan whose sales decreased from the previous year's by 54.3% to
42,000. Market giant Toyota's sales ended down by 34.7% to 107,000. Isuzu dropped 32.4% to
82,500, and Honda dropped a mere 12.4% to 37,000 (AP, 1/19/98).
Based on these changed conditions, analysts have revised their predictions for the coming
years as a way to help industry plan for the future. In a report released by Automotive Resources
Asia Ltd. in February 1998, they conclude that "light vehicle production (defined as passenger
cars, pickup trucks, sport-utility vehicles, Asian-utility vehicles, and vans) in Southeast Asia's
four major vehicle producing countries -- Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines --
will only reach 718,000 units in 1998, a 38 per cent decline from the 1.17 million vehicles
produced in the region in 1997...by 2002, however, light vehicle production in the region will
reach 1.049 million units" (Automotive Resources Asia Ltd, 1998).
2.3.3 Cautious Commitment
As a result of these newly revised predictions and other related concerns, the auto industry
has responded conservatively but firmly. They have been conservative in that they have scaled
back production capacity and rates in order to hedge their short-term risks in this reduced and
uncertain market, but all of the major manufacturers have remained firm in their commitment to
produce automobiles in Thailand for the ASEAN market and beyond.
Specifically, General Motors has announced that it has scaled back its US $750 million
plant to $500 million and delay opening until late 1999. In addition, plant's initial production
capacity will be reduced to 40,000 units/year from the originally planned 100,000 units/yr. Ford
has chosen to complete its original investment but to use 1 shift rather than two. Toyota, Nissan,
and Honda have also cut back production and in some cases closed entire factories. Honda has
tentatively announced that by 1999 it's plant will likely produce only 30,000 units of its 60,000
capacity (AP, 1/19/98; Taylor, 3/17/97).
Finally, rounding out these efforts at reducing risk, in late 1997 the government
made a slight reversal of its liberalization policies by raising the duty on all CBU passenger
cars to 80% and setting the duty on CKD parts to 20% through the end of 1999 as a means to
protect the domestic auto industry from foreign competition during this time of vulnerability (SAE,
1998b).
3. Environmental Impact of Motor Vehicles
3.1 Overview
One would expect that the greater the level of human activity, the greater the impact would
be on the environment. For this reason, urban areas would tend to concentrate pollution while at
the same time increasing the number of people exposed to that pollution due to the increased
population densities that characterize the urban environment. For this reason, Thailand's urban
areas should be of great concern from an environmental and public health point of view (though
there are certainly other serious environmental problems which can be unrelated to the urban areas-
deforestation, contamination of ground water and/or surface water, unsustainable aquaculture).
And given that Bangkok is more than 50 times larger than Thailand's second largest city, Chiang
Mai, one would expect that the bulk of Thailand's urban public health and environmental problems
will occur in the Bangkok metropolitan area.
In general, urban areas, and especially those in developing countries, are afflicted with
numerous environmental problems of different forms and magnitudes. For this reason, it is often
difficult to generalize the types of conditions which give rise to them. Nevertheless, one insightful
means of categorization was proposed in a publication jointly authored by the World Resources
Institute, the United Nations, and the World Bank. This report suggested that "[urban]
environmental problems...can be grouped into two broad classes: those associated with poverty
and those associated with economic growth or affluence." However, the report goes on to concede
that due to the complex and inequitable distribution of resources, both types of problems often
coexist within the same city (WRI et al., 1996, p. 1).
The environmental impacts of motor vehicles in Bangkok provide an ideal example of a
problem of growth and affluence. As the standard of living in Bangkok rose, more people moved
into the city seeking a better life. However, the influx of people quickly exceeded the capacity of
the city to absorb these people and more importantly their acquisition of motorcycles and
automobiles. As a result of this rapid growth and affluence, the residents of Bangkok are now
subject to a wide variety of air pollutants and motor vehicle noise. As one begins to consider how
to improve mobility in Thailand and what role the automobile should play, it is necessary to
develop an understanding of these problems and their implications for the environment, human
health, and the economy.
3.2 Air Pollution
3.2.1 Physical & Climatic Characteristics
Bangkok is very fortunate with respect to air pollution because it has numerous natural
characteristics which minimize the severity of the air pollution problems its hot (mean temperature
varies from 25 to 300C) and humid climate would otherwise enhance. First and foremost,
Bangkok's topography is uniformly flat and without mountains which can trap pollutants and
facilitate the formation of inversion layers which trap pollutants for anywhere from hours to days.
Also, Bangkok is located 20 km north of the Gulf of Thailand which means that it receives
continuous land-sea breezes 8. In addition, Bangkok benefits from seasonal winds which are
northeasterly from October through January and southwesterly from February through September.
And finally, much of Bangkok is surrounded by the Bangkrajao forest which together with these
winds provides a buffer and cleaning mechanism for air pollutants which would otherwise persist
for longer periods of time (Phantumvanit and Liengcharernsit, 1989, p.36-37; WHO/UNEP,
1992, p.49)
Bangkok is also the beneficiary of a sound planning policy which was implemented in the
mid-1970's. This policy shifted industrial growth out of Bangkok and into newly created
8 Land-sea breezes are winds induced by the diurnal heating of the land by the sun during the day and subsequent
cooling at night.
industrial parks on the outskirts of the city. As a result, Bangkok has small and medium-sized
industrial facilities dispersed throughout the city, but the bulk of the industrial activity (e.g. large
stationary sources) is located 20 km to the southeast of Bangkok in the industrial town of Samut
Prakan. Given its geographic position off of Bangkok's northeast/southwest wind axis, Bangkok
is rarely affected by these emissions (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.49).
Despite these numerous beneficial conditions, Bangkok still has severe air pollution
problems primarily due to motor vehicle emissions. A recent study by Thailand's Pollution
Control Department (PCD) estimated that in Bangkok, 87% of carbon monoxide, 41% of
hydrocarbons, and 64% of nitrogen oxides were emitted by the transportation sector
(Wangwongwatana, circa 1993, p.3). While these statistics are impressive on their own, the
implications become more serious when one recognizes that motor vehicle pollutants are emitted at
curb level and in the urban context of narrow streets surrounded by tall buildings. This physical
configuration reduces mixing, dispersion, and advection of airborne pollutants, and as a result the
phenomenon has been termed the "street canyon" effect.9
The most deleterious implication of the 'street canyon' effect is that urban roads provide the
means by which the majority of Bangkok's population commute to and from work by either foot,
motorcycle, or open-air bus. Moreover many people suffer from the street canyon effect for
extended periods of time due to: (1) working in retail stores on the ground-floor of stores which
open onto the street, (2) living in open-air apartment buildings along-side these roads, and (3)
working as street-car vendors and food preparers (many of which prepare meals a few feet from
the exhaust pipes of automobiles stuck in grid-locked traffic).
9 The term 'street canyon' is due to an urban city street's similarity to a deep, narrow canyon which has poor air
circulation due to the large vertical distance between the canyon floor and the lateral movement of air above the top
of the canyon.
3.2.2 Public Health Impacts
Based on the substantial opportunities for both acute and chronic exposure to high
concentrations of automobile pollutants, it seems likely that Bangkok's residents are experiencing
adverse health effects due to the direct inhalation of pollutants either in their homes, at work, or
during their commute-- or even indirectly through the consumption of contaminated foods or
liquids. Unfortunately, there is very little data which can be used to determine the true impacts of
air pollution, and the data that does exist appears to severely under-represented the magnitude of
Bangkok's problems. Nevertheless, a few health surveys have been performed including one in
1995 which found that the occurrence rate of pollution-related disease was 19% in Bangkok, but
only 8% in rural areas (Wangwongwatana, 1998, p.34).
Despite this lack of Bangkok-specific data, there is a wealth of public health knowledge
regarding the effects of motor vehicle emissions. This information can aid in qualitatively
assessing the impacts of air emissions.
3.2.2.1 Lessons from Around the Globe
Throughout the world, studies have consistently found that urban air pollution adversely
affects both the respiratory and cardiovascular systems and can result in both acute and
chronic illnesses such as asthma and bronchitis. In addition, a consensus is emerging that
the most dangerous pollutants are small suspended particles which have a diameter of less
than 10 microns, hence they are called PM-10, and can be easily breathed into the lungs
(WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.11; WRI et al., 1996, p.46).
In order to better quantify the impacts of such pollution, numerous public health studies
have been conducted throughout the world. According to epidemiological studies conducted in
United States' cities it has been consistently suggested that since the 1970s, "air pollution kills-
primarily through respiratory or cardiovascular disease-about 30,000 to 60,000 people per year,
[which accounts] for 2 to 3 percent of all [urban] deaths" (WRI et al., 1996, p.46-47). Similar
studies from the cities of the developing world have found more extreme effects. For example, in
Jakarta, of its population of 10 million, it was determined that roughly 600,000 childhood asthma
attacks and 125,000 cases of childhood bronchitis would be prevented each year if ambient air
concentrations met WHO standards (Ostro, 1994, p. 114).
Finally, on a global level, the World Bank has estimated "that if particulate levels alone
were reduced to WHO guidelines, between 300,000 and 700,000 premature deaths per year could
be avoided globally. That is the equivalent of roughly 2 to 5 percent of all deaths in urban areas
that have excessive levels of particulates. In addition, chronic coughing in urban children under
the age of 14 could be reduced by half, or about 50 million cases annually, [thereby] reducing the
chance that these children will face permanent respiratory damage. Improving urban air quality
should also reduce the incidence of chronic and infectious respiratory diseases." (WRI et al., 1995,
p.22).
3.2.2.2 Probable Impacts & the Legislative Response
In light of the public health community's substantial experience in assessing the likely
consequences of air pollution (as reflected above), in 1990 the US Agency for International
Development estimated "that each year there are 10-50 million person-days of restricted activity for
respiratory reasons in Bangkok which are not reported" (USAID, 1990). In 1992 the
WHO/UNEP reached the similar though less quantitative conclusion that "the population exposed
to these levels of automotive pollutants are likely to suffer pulmonary impairments leading to some
restrictions on activity. Susceptible individuals will have increased rates of respiratory illness."
(WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.15).
In 1981, in light of the emerging global consensus regarding the seriousness of urban air
pollution as well as what was undoubtedly prudent and proactive leadership, Thailand passed
national ambient air quality standards for the six main pollutants: carbon monoxide, ozone, sulphur
dioxide, suspended particulates, nitrogen dioxide, and lead (Phantumvanit and Liengcharernsit,
1989, p.36). In almost all cases these were roughly equivalent to the WHO standards
(WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.221-226).
As well-intentioned as the passage of these standards may have been, however, the absence
of a clear enforcement authority within Thailand (the Pollution Control Department was formed in
1992) coupled with the rapid growth in both the economy and the automobile fleet, these standards
went largely unenforced. In the following sections each of these pollutants will be discussed in
greater detail and the current concentrations and state of compliance presented.
3.2.3 Suspended Particulate Matter
"Results of air quality monitoring over the past eleven years indicate that the air pollutants
of greatest concern in Bangkok are suspended particulate matter (SPM), especially
respirable particulate matter (PM10) and carbon monoxide...the principal concern with
these air pollutants is along major roads in Bangkok where pollutant concentrations are
high enough to cause significant adverse health impacts on the population. Levels of SPM
and PM10 in Bangkok's air, especially along congested roads, have far exceeded
Thailand's primary ambient air quality standards. In 1996, curbside 24-hour average
concentrations of suspended particulate matter exceeded the standard of 0.33 mg/m3 at all
monitoring sites with the annual mean of 0.48 mg/m3 and the range of 0.03 to 2.42
mg/m3. There were 168 days out of 288 observation days (58% of the total observations)
having daily PM10 concentrations exceeding the standard."
Dr. Supat Wangwongwatana, Director
Air Quality and Noise Management Division, Thai Pollution Control
Presented at Thailand Automotive Technology Conference, 3/30/98
(SAE, 1998c, p.12).
As described above, the most serious threat to the public health in Bangkok is suspended
particulate matter (SPM). SPM consists of small grains of solid material whose mass is so small
that they are able to remain suspended in the air for extended periods of time. While suspended,
they can be inhaled into the human respiratory system and become lodged in the lungs. Based on
current research, the threshold for respirable particulate matter (particles small enough to be able to
be drawn into the lungs) is believed to be 10 microns which has given rise to the designation
PM 10. Once these particles become lodged in the lungs, they impair the functionality of the
immediate area and irritate the surrounding tissue which can facilitate other medical problems. As a
result, elevated concentrations of SPM can increase the rate of death, disease, and impaired
pulmonary function (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p. 11). Finally, these effects can be magnified if the
particulate or sorbed chemicals are toxic in nature.
As with almost all pollutants, SPM comes from both natural (e.g. sea salt, wind-suspended
dust) and anthropogenic sources (such as automobiles and industrial emission) but Bangkok's two
air pollution monitoring networks (one maintained by the Ministry of Health, the other by the
Office of the National Environment Board or ONEB) confirm that at roadside locations,
anthropogenic sources contribute between 70 and 90% of all particulate matter (ONEB, 1989).
While monitoring activities are not detailed enough to identify specific anthropogenic sources, the
primary suspected sources are diesel-engine exhaust and emissions from light industry
(WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.52). Moreover, SPM emissions have been estimated to have doubled
from 40,000 ton/year in 1980 to roughly 80,000 tons/year in 1990 (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p. 5 1).
Finally, studies conducted by the PCD and the ONEB over the last ten years have confirmed that
60% by weight of Bangkok's particulates qualify for the harmful PM-10 designation (SAE, 1998c,
p. 12; ONEB, 1989). This suggests that aside from the measured trends in SPM, the threat from
the more difficult to measure PM10 continues to increase thereby exposing the population to
progressively higher concentrations. For a more detailed time series of three Bangkok SPM
monitoring sites, refer to Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 which show annual mean and annual 98
percentile SPM concentrations between 1976 and 1990, respectively.
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Figure 3.1: Annual mean suspended
(WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.52).
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Figure 3.2: Annual 98 percentile suspended particulate matter concentrations for three
Bangkok sites (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.52).
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3.2.4 Carbon Monoxide
As presented in the previous quote by Dr. Wangwongwatana, carbon monoxide is the
second most serious pollutant in Bangkok. This is because even low concentrations of carbon
monoxide, which is formed as a result of the incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, has a strong
adverse impact on the ability of red blood cells to carry oxygen throughout the body. This is the
result of the fact that carbon monoxide has a high affinity for hemoglobin and is able to displace
oxygen in the blood, which can potentially lead to the development of severe cardiovascular and
neurobehavioural problems. (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p. 1 1)
According to the PCD, 1996 curbside 8-hour average carbon monoxide concentrations
reached a maximum of 22.81 mg/m3 with an annual average of 4.38 mg/m3. Only 129 of 7,599
concentration measurements (1.7% of total) for the year exceeded the Thai standard of 10.26
mg/m3 which is in line with the WHO recommendation of 10 mg/m3 (SAE, 1998c, p.12;
WHO/UNEP, 1992, p. 12). In addition, the 1996 maximum 1-hour concentration was 29.38
mg/m3 which is below the Thai standard of 34.2 mg/m3 and the WHO standard of 30 mg/m3
(SAE, 1998c, p.12; WHO/UNEP, 1992, p. 12).
While there is little comprehensive data available on the sources of carbon monoxide in
Bangkok, the year-round warm temperatures mean that there is no domestic heating and therefore
the bulk of carbon monoxide emissions can be attributed to the incomplete combustion of fuels in
motor vehicles. Using this knowledge, 1980 emissions were predicted to have been between
120,000-160,000 tons/year (Faiz et al., 1990). The WHO/UNEP later adjusted this estimate to
280,000 tons/year in 1990 and is projecting emissions of 420,000 tons/year by the year 2000
(WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.53).
3.2.5 Sulphur Dioxide
Similar to suspended particulate matter, elevated concentrations of sulphur dioxide (SO 2)
can result in increased rates of death, disease, and impaired pulmonary function (WHO/UNEP,
1992, p. 11). Unfortunately the ability to quantify these effects is restricted by limited information
regarding the source and distribution of SO2 as well as the more important street level
concentrations which determine the effective urban exposure. Despite the lack of detailed
information, city-wide annual trends are available for 1980 to 1987 (shown in Figure 3.3). This
data, while collected at fixed sites which are not necessarily representative of urban exposures,
demonstrate that ambient concentrations of SO2 in Bangkok are consistently significantly below the
Thai and WHO standards (1-year mean of 100 gg/m3 and 60gg/m3, 24-hour mean of 300 gg/m3
and 150.tg/m3, respectively). Moreover, throughout the 1980s the mean concentrations were
relatively stable and the annual maximum concentration decreased throughout the decade. While
no studies have been done regarding the cause of these trends, they are likely the result of
Bangkok's year-round winds, improved emissions controls at factories, and the relocation of S02
emitting industries to industrial estates located off the NE/SW wind axis.
In the past, the lack of data regarding S02 sources has resulted in studies which predict
emissions based on theoretical assumptions. However, these studies have utilized different
assumptions and accordingly produced very different conclusions. For this reason, the true
sources of SO2 emissions are still unknown, but experience and intuition suggest that major
sources include industries which use fuel oil and high-sulphur lignite as well as diesel-fueled
vehicles. While experts suspect that diesel-fueled vehicles are currently contributing less than 5%
of the total SO2 emissions, it is these emissions which produce elevated road-side conditions and
result in serious exposure (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.51). Moreover, as industry continues to leave
Bangkok for industrial parks and the size of the automobile fleet further increases, the aggregate
emissions of S02 and especially the ground level concentrations will likely continue to increase.
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Figure 3.3: Annual mean, 98 percentile, and annual maximum sulphur dioxide concentrations
at the GEMS site (WHO/UNEP, 1992, Figure 6.2).
3.2.6 Oxides of Nitrogen
Another common pollutant in automobile emissions are oxides of nitrogen. The most
common is nitrogen dioxide which is known to affect the respiratory system including diminished
lung function, increased inflammation, and increased airway reactivity (WHO/UNEP, 1992,
p. 11). There is very little information regarding the concentrations of oxides of nitrogen (NOx)
and of the studies that have been done, the findings have been inconsistent with observation. For
this reason, the existing data must be viewed with suspicion. With this in mind, it has been
observed that the ambient NOx concentrations currently meet the 24-hour mean WHO guideline of
150 ptg/m3 NO2 equivalents. Likewise, the ONEB monitoring sites find that the one-hour
concentration of N02 has never exceeded the Thai one-hour standard of 320tg/m3 since
monitoring began in 1987, though it did get close with 270 gg/m3 occurring at one site in 1989.
(WHO/UNEP, 1992, Section 6.3).
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3.2.7 Ozone
Ozone (03) is perhaps the most complex air pollutant to address because it is not a
component of vehicle exhaust itself. Rather it is the product of a complex reaction between NOx
and hydrocarbons ° in the presence of sunlight. Ozone is most commonly known due to its
primary role in the production of photochemical smog which obscures visibility and lowers the
quality of life in many large cities around the world. More importantly though, ozone can cause a
wide range of adverse human health effects, especially in the respiratory system. Sample effects
include increased rate of asthma attacks, severe respiratory irritation including inflammation of the
lungs, decrease in lung function, and increase in airway reactivity as well as less serious problems
such as headaches and irritation of the eyes, nose, and throat (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p. 1 1).
Ozone is typically a serious problem in warm, sunny urban areas, however, Bangkok's
year-round land-sea breezes continuously ventilate the city, thereby transporting the resultant ozone
to either the less populated region to the northeast (which could be experiencing deleterious effects)
or to the Gulf of Thailand to the southwest. As a result of these favorable conditions, the 1989
maximum one-hour mean ambient ozone concentration was 100 gg/m3 which is well below the
Thai and WHO guidelines of 200 gtg/m3 (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.54).
3.2.8 Lead
Lead has historically been recognized as one of the most harmful automobile pollutants.
This is because lead, which was frequently used as an additive in automotive fuels, is emitted into
the air along with other pollutants. If it is subsequently inhaled into the body, the lead enters the
blood stream where it inhibits the ability of red blood cells to produce hemoglobin and thereby
reduces the body's ability to deliver oxygen throughout the body. Moreover, lead damages the
0o Hydrocarbon, also termed volatile organic carbon or VOC in this context, is the leftover unburnt fuel (due to
incomplete combustion) which exits the vehicle tail pipe along with other pollutants.
liver and kidneys reducing their ability to function and it can also result in irreversible neurological
damage (WHO/UNEP, 1992, p. 11).
Through the experiences of the developed nations, the world has learned the dangers posed
by lead to children and adults in terms of learning disabilities and mental impairment. Based on
these lessons as well as the 1992 requirement that catalytic converters be installed on all new
vehicles, Thailand has recently completed (1989-1995) a major phase-out of leaded gasoline. As a
result of the newly unleaded fuels and the fact that there are currently no major lead-emitting
industrial sources, ambient lead levels have dropped from a maximum roadside 24-hr average lead
concentration of 7.56 gg/m3 and an annual average concentration of 1.52gg/m3 in 1991 to
0.52gg/m3 and 0.1 gg/m3, respectively, in 1996. Similar reductions have also been observed in
non-roadside, general areas. Accordingly, ambient lead concentrations in Bangkok are now well
below the WHO guidelines for average annual lead concentration. (Wangwongwattana, 2/20/98).
3.2.9 Environmental & Other Impacts
Aside from the effects already discussed, automobile pollutants have other effects on both
society and the natural environment. These effects cover a broad range and they occur on both
spatial and temporal time scales of which we are still beginning to understand. One of the more
well-known problems is that of acid-deposition which can occur on local-, medium-, or long-range
scales. Acid deposition is more commonly known of as acid rain (i.e. wet deposition), but dry
deposition also occurs. The problem can be traced back to automobile emissions of sulphur
dioxide and oxides of nitrogen which serve as precursors to acid formation. The result of acid
deposition are generally thought to be the acidification of soil and lakes, but the end ecosystem
effects are very difficult to assess given the highly variable responses that different systems have to
small changes in acidity (WRI et al., 1996, p.23; WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.12).
Another serious problem is that of crop and forest damage. Sulphur dioxide, nitrogen
dioxide, and ozone are all phytotoxic which means they are poisonous to plants. As a result, these
automobile pollutants have been implicated in decline of agricultural crop production and natural
forests. These same three pollutants also damage human-made buildings and works of art
including historic monuments such as The Grand Palace and the numerous wats which are
increasingly in need of restoration to counteract air pollution-induced damage (WRI et al., 1996,
p.23; WHO/UNEP, 1992, p.12).
As scientists have learned more about these pollutants, the regional and global nature of the
urban plumes which emanate from cities have become better understood as well. This is because
these pollutants often take a great deal of time to decompose or transform, if in fact they ever cease
causing damage. The most recent discovery which falls along these lines is the possibility of
global climate change as a result of the production of greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide
(which is emitted by the burning of fossil fuels such as gasoline and diesel). In this case, the
problem is truly global both in terms of emissions and adverse effects, and the time scales are
equally daunting because they may extend into the hundreds of years.
3.3 Noise Pollution
Throughout Bangkok, the sound of traffic is heard around the clock. During the day the
streets are clogged with cars, buses, motorcycles, and small trucks. At night, tractor trailers,
which are forbidden in Bangkok during the day, fill the roads to both replenish the city's supplies
for the next day and to bring out what it has consumed and/or produced that day. For this reason,
Bangkok's roads are heavily utilized around the clock by a fleet of generally poorly maintained
vehicles or even 'powertuned' vehicles which have been tampered with to increase performance at
the cost of louder operation and decreased fuel economy (which both increases emissions and
requires more fuel). Finally, aggressive driver behavior which is encouraged by the highly
congested streets leads to the excessive use of braking and horn-honking. All of this adds
tremendously to the ambient noise levels that those who live and work in Bangkok must endure.
Unfortunately, like air pollution, such noise has harmful effects of its own. These include
hearing damage and loss as well as adverse impacts on the psychological well-being of citizens. In
addition, lands which are exposed to excessive noise pollution typically suffer a loss in property
value due to the loss in utility which accompanies such unwanted noise (WRI et al, 1996, p86-87).
In 1983, after receiving numerous complaints regarding excessive ambient noise, Thailand's
ONEB began monitoring noise levels throughout Bangkok. After four years of monitoring (1983-
87), the ONEB found that many locations frequently exceeded the US EPA standard for long-term
hearing protection of 70 decibels almost exclusively due to nearby truck, bus, and motorcycle
traffic. In addition, the ONEB found a school classroom whose ambient noise level ranged from
76 to 95 decibels as well as a home with a noise level of 77.9 decibels. In all cases, the ONEB's
observations found that ambient noise levels in Bangkok significantly exceeded the 65 decibel level
that most OECD countries believe represents the limit of human comfort (Phantumvanit and
Liengcharernsit, 1989, p.37)
While the ONEB found that trucks, buses, and motorcycles cause the bulk of noise
pollution, the other primary sources of noise pollution in Bangkok include industry and
construction, and to a lesser degree the many boats and water taxis which travel the klongs and the
Chao Phraya River. Consistent with the identification of motor vehicles and boats as producing
the bulk of ambient noise, Thailand adopted a vehicle noise emission standard in the early 1980's
of '85 decibels at 7.5 meters.' During its 1983-87 studies, however, the ONEB found that nearly
20% of vehicles fail to meet this standard (Phantumvanit and Liengcharernsit, 1989, p.37).
Additional corroboration of these findings was further provided by a 1985 study conducted by
Chulalongkorn University which found that roughly 21% of motorcycles violated the noise
standard and that 80% of motorboats exceeded the less stringent pre-1985 standard of '90 decibels
at 7.5 meters.' As part of this later study, Chulalongkorn University researchers surveyed 85
motor-boat operators and found that 80% of the them had experienced hearing loss (Phantumvanit
and Liengcharernsit, 1989, p.38).
Based on the ONEB and Chulalongkorn studies it is clear that noise pollution is a severe
problem for Bangkok's citizens who must endure ambient noise levels which are not only
uncomfortable, but can lead to permanent hearing loss. As disturbing as these finding are,
however, perhaps even more disappointing is the acknowledgment that the existing rules which are
intended to prevent this serious problem are not enforced.
4. Current Challenges, Tradeoffs, and Opportunities
Thailand's rapid growth, strong pro-business environment, and non-interventionist
government together with low wages and the huge regional market brought billions of dollars of
investment to Thailand over the last 30 years including US $14 billion in 1996 alone (BOI, 1997).
Unfortunately, the government's laissez-faire policy also resulted in inaction, or at best limited
action, to address a number of serious challenges which all developing countries must confront as
their economies grow and acquire new and changing needs. After nearly 30 years of inadequate
attention, many of these challenges have evolved into serious problems which impose substantial
costs on Thailand's economy and limits the government's ability to develop and provide improved
quality of life to its citizens. Throughout Thailand this has resulted in very limited mobility for
people, goods, and services; significant contamination of the environment including air, water, and
land; as well as a growing income gap between the nation's rich and poor. These problems are
especially pronounced in Bangkok where 11 million people live in close proximity despite having
an unsafe water supply system, no wastewater collection or treatment system (though one is being
constructed in phases), and a severely limited transportation infrastructure.
During the rapid growth of the past, many of these challenges were downplayed or ignored
given the massive prosperity and the speed of Bangkok's development. This response was
reasonable given the fact that many in society could afford these inefficiencies and costs.
Moreover, it was easy to dismiss such concerns as simply being part and parcel of living in
Bangkok. However, now that Thailand's economy has weakened, these problems are more
visible and the inefficiencies are too costly to be ignored or written off as unavoidable by eve the
wealthiest individuals, firms, or the government at large. For that reason, these problems require
that government, industry, and citizens all do their part to contribute toward the long-term objective
of solving these problems, as well as the more modest objective of mitigating these problems and
improving quality of life. However, in order to address these problems effectively, it is necessary
to improve one's understanding of each of these problems, how they are interconnected, and
where opportunities exist to shift toward a more sustainable balance between economic
development and the urban environmental problems caused by automobiles. In this chapter each of
the key concerns are presented and the relevant issues discussed.
4.1 Mobility & Transportation Infrastructure
4.1.1 Status Quo
Throughout the world, Bangkok is legendary for having traffic congestion and a general
lack of mobility which is among the worst in the world. According to a 1996 World Bank study,
traffic speeds in central Bangkok decreased by 2 percent per year throughout the late 1980s which
resulted in the average car being stationary in congestion for 44 days per year (World Bank, 1996,
p.16). A separate 1994 study examined congestion within different regions of the Bangkok
Metropolitan Area (BMA) and found that the 24-hour average vehicle speed in the core of the city
center was 7.2 km/hr (see Table 4.1).
Region of the Bangkok Metropolitan Area Average Speed (km/hour)
Core of Center City 7.2
Center City 8.9
City 12.1
Surrounding Areas 11.7
Table 4.1: Average private vehicle speed, evening rush hour 1994 (Vongpivat, 1998a, p.16;
Vongpivat, 1998b).
This congestion, however, is not just an inconvenience which must be endured--it is a
constraint upon the quality of life and the national economy. As such, it has substantial direct and
indirect costs, only a few of which are easy to calculate. The Thai Office of the Commission for
the Management of Road Traffic (OCMRT) has estimated that 3.5 billion liters of fuel are wasted
each year simply due to congestion. This alone corresponds to 0.5% of the 1995 national GDP or
nearly US $880 million/yr at a rough pre-1996 exchange rate of 25 Baht to US $1 (OCMRT,
1997). Another study estimated that 5.9 billion person hours are consumed by traffic congestion
(Vongpivat, 1998a, p.21). Placing an aggregate value on the cost of congestion is very difficult
due to the number of assumptions and considerations involved. Among others, this also includes
assessing the additional auto emissions and their impacts, the resultant health effects, the
opportunity cost of the lost fuel and worker time, the decreased quality of life and labor
productivity of the worker related to added stress and frustration, and shorter working lives (WRI
et al, 1996, p.24). Despite these difficulties, the cost of congestion in Bangkok have been
estimated to be as large as 33% of the potential gross city product or more than US $1.46 billion in
1992 (Strickland, 1993, p.4).
4.1.1.1 Vehicles
Perhaps most indicative of the cause of congestion problem is the rapid increase in
registered vehicles in Bangkok. In 1980 there were 600,000 vehicles. By 1993 this had soared to
3.6 million vehicles. This corresponds to nearly 15% annual growth for 13 years. During the
same period, however, the supply of roads in Thailand grew between 1.0 and 1.5% per year
(OCMRT, 1997, p.4). Despite this divergence between the supply and demand for roads, the
Bangkok fleet continued to grow. In 1996, growth was maintained at roughly 10% or 300,000
vehicles, of which 162,000 were motorcycles. This represented an 11% increase in motorcycle
sales from the previous year (Vongpivat, 1998a, p.20).
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Figure 4.1: Total Registered Vehicles in Bangkok and Thailand 1987-1996 (Department of
Land Transportation, 1997).
As of 1996, Thailand had more than 9 million motorcycles and 4 million automobiles. Of
this 13 million total, 3.5 million were located in Bangkok. The vehicle fleet in Thailand is rather
diverse with motorcycles being the largest group at 1.5 million motorcycles, 1 million personal
automobiles, 770 thousand vans, 100 thousand trucks, 35 thousand buses and 100 thousand other
taxis, tuk-tuks", and miscellaneous vehicles (Suksod, 1998).
" Currently there are 7,300 tuk-tuks or three-wheeled taxis. Due to a government decision they are being eliminated
and no new units are being produced.
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Figure 4.2: Bangkok vehicle fleet registration
4.1.1.2 Physical Infrastructure
(Suksod, 1998).
The complementary cause of Bangkok's congestion is a lack of physical transportation
infrastructure. This lack of infrastructure is also the country's largest impediment to increased
mobility. As previously noted, new road construction had not kept pace with the vehicle growth
experienced in Bangkok between 1980 and 1993. However, the true state of Bangkok's mobility
situation is better assessed by a comparison between Bangkok and an average of numerous US and
European cities as well as an average of Singapore, Tokyo, Hong Kong (referred to as 'Asian
Cities') as shown in Table 4.2.
US Cities European Cities Asian Cities Bangkok
Urban Density 14 50 164 144
(people/ha)
Road Length per capita 7.2 2.4 1.1 0.6
(meters)
Passenger Cars/ 602 392 123 153
1000 people
Total Vehicles/ 755 452 217 348
1000 people
% workers using 4.7 16.7 20.3 10
foot and bike
I
% of total passenger 3.2 22.9 64.1 36.6
km on public transit I I
Table 4.2: Transportation infrastructures throughout the world, 1990 (Kenworthy & Laube,
1996, p.282-4).
As this information shows, Bangkok's population density is slightly less than typical Asian
cities, yet it has roughly half the road length per capita, almost 25% more personal vehicles, and
60% more total vehicles. Moreover, many fewer people walk or bike to work because of
dangerous travel conditions or undesirable, impractical commutes. Finally, the percentage of total
passenger kilometers traveled on public transit reveals that Bangkok uses 40 percent less public
transportation than other Asian cities. In short, these statistics show that Bangkok has more cars,
fewer roads, and uses less public transportation than other Asian cities with similar urban
densities.
As serious as the lack of infrastructure is, the most pervasive problem for Bangkok lies in
the small amount of space reserved for roads in Bangkok. Relative to the international standard of
20 to 25%, Bangkok has only 11% of total space reserved for roads. This low percentage is the
direct result of Bangkok's agrarian beginnings which were based around large common
agricultural areas surrounded by a network of roads. As development took hold, the interior of
these 'superblocks' were replaced with new buildings which continued to be served by the
traditional small, narrow, winding roads called 'sois' which extend only part way into these
superblocks. As a result of this development pattern, the large number of people which can be
located within a single superblock are all forced to use the surrounding road network not only to
travel to/from distant locations, but also to travel within the same superblock. In other words, they
must travel from 'sois' to the surrounding primary road and then re-enter the superblock at the
appropriate 'sois.' For this reason, the primary roads are forced to accommodate purely local
traffic in addition to the substantial volumes of city and regional traffic. (Gakenheimer, 1998;
Vongpivat, 1998a, p. 1 1). This puts excessive loads on roadway systems which should typically
be designed for either the movement of goods and persons or for access to buildings,
pickup/dropoff areas, and parking areas. Unfortunately, due to the extent of development and the
high cost of land in Bangkok, it is extremely unlikely that this will change (Wangwongwatana in
SAE, 1998c, p.11).
4.1.1.3 Public Transportation
Despite this lack of infrastructure and perhaps more importantly, the lack of physical space
for new infrastructure, a collaborative team of experts from the Bangkok Metropolitan
Administration's (BMA) Department of City Planning and MIT' s Department of Urban Studies and
Planning concluded that "Bangkok is suffering not so much from a lack of road space as from a
lack of viable transport alternatives" (BMA/MIT, 1996, p.3). In other words, Bangkok's most
serious problem results from the fact that the only practical form of travel is by personal car or
motorcycle. In 1992 the government recognized this problem and modified the 7th National Plan
(1992-1996) accordingly. Under this plan, the five-year budget increased by 680% to 335 billion
Baht (or US $13.4 billion over five years at a 25 Baht : US $1 exchange rate). Of this allocation,
42% was devoted to public transportation projects. Then in 1997, the 8th National Plan further
increased the five-year transportation budget to 528 billion Baht with public transit designated to
receive 47% of the total. (Vongpivat, 1998a, p.23-24). Despite these expenditures, there are
currently only three forms of public transportation available to the citizens of Bangkok: buses,
taxis (both car and motorcycle), and boat. However, the first of several planned and partially
constructed mass rapid transit systems is expected to open in 1999 which will provide another
option (Wanisubut, 1998b). Table 4.3 provides a brief summary of the current distribution of
daily travel modes.
Travel Mode Number of Person-Trips Percent of all Trips
Car and Pickup Truck 7.7 million 36 %
Private Motorcycle 4.2 20
Taxi, motorcycle taxi, tuk-tuk 2.5 12
Bus 6.3 30
Boat, Train 0.4 2
Total 21.0 100
Table 4.3: Daily Travel Mode Distribution, Bangkok Metropolitan Region, 1995 (OCMRT,
1997).
The Public and Private Bus System
As shown by Table 4.3, of all forms of public transportation in Bangkok, the public and
private bus systems are by far the most frequently used providing more than 6.3 million person-
trips per day (30% of the total) and 68% of all public transportation. Bangkok's bus system began
more than 80 years ago and was originally completely provided by the private sector, but in 1976
the 25 existing private companies were consolidated and transferred to the public sector under the
management of the Bangkok Mass Transportation Authority (BMTA). Since then, the BMTA has
operated at a deficit and is currently more than 10 billion Baht in debt. In light of this poor
performance and more importantly due to unreliable, low-quality service, the government
encouraged private bus companies to re-enter the market and augment the public bus system
around 1980 (Wanisbut, 1998b). As a result, today there are roughly 5,000 public open-air (non-
air-conditioned) buses with a fare of 3.5 Baht per trip; 1,200 public air-conditioned buses with a
fare of 7.0 Baht; and roughly 1,000 private air conditioned buses with a fare that ranges from 15 to
30 Baht (Wanisubut, 1998b; BMTA as cited in Vongpivat, 1998a, p.36) 12
In addition to being severely in debt, the public bus system is inefficient, poorly managed,
and provides low quality services as the following characteristics demonstrate (Vongpivat, 1998a,
p.6; Wanisubut, 1998b):
*There is an inadequate supply of buses which often results in: 1) dangerously overloaded
buses with passengers struggling for space and sometimes hanging from the bus,
and 2) buses skipping stops due to lack of passenger room;
*Buses and bus stops are dirty and unpleasant, the open-air buses are particularly bad due
to Bangkok's heat and the poor air quality in the street due to motor vehicle
emissions and congestion;
*The average age of the entire bus fleet is six years old, but individual buses range from 2
to 14 years old;
*The fleet is in such disrepair that 20% of it is in for maintenance each day, and the repairs
are haphazard and of poor quality sometimes resulting in the endangerment of
passengers;
*Buses often block traffic for long periods of time (thereby worsening congestion) as
people attempt to pay the boarding fee which is often difficult to make change for;
*Bus drivers do not maintain their schedules and often drive dangerously causing
passengers to fall.
Finally, an additional drawback to all of Bangkok's bus systems is that the buses move
more slowly through congested streets than smaller, more agile cars, thereby making bus travel
more time consuming and even less desirable for those who can afford taxis, motorcycle taxis, or a
private automobile or motorcycle of their own.
12 There is a surprisingly large disprepancy between different sources regarding the number of different types of buses
and their fares. This represents the author's best assessment of the current services provided based on
communications with two partially conflicting government sources.
Waterway transportation
Waterway transportation is generally regarded as a far superior form of transportation when
the river/klong system suits the travel need. This is because there are far fewer boats on the water
meaning that a commuter can avoid the traffic congestion of the streets. However, this system is
also poorly operated and often considered unsafe due to poorly maintained docks and piers, severe
overloading of passengers (boats sometimes reach three times the legal limit), and drivers who
travel at unsafe speeds and depart before all passengers are fully loaded. For these reasons as well
as the occasional passenger falling into the highly-polluted waters below, it is well known that boat
travel is not for everyone. (Vongpivat, 1998a, p. 7-8).
Planned Mass Rapid Transit Systems
Beginning with the 7th National Plan in 1992, Bangkok has committed itself to
constructing a Mass Rapid Transit (MRT) system throughout the Bangkok metropolitan region
(BMR). While attempts have been made to coordinate the MRT with existing and new bus feeders
and light rail trains, the different 'lines' (there are five) of the MRT have not been thoroughly well
coordinated. More importantly, the government has required that the MRT be privately financed
and constructed. This has resulted in the different 'lines' being awarded to different contractors as
individual concession projects. Due to the economic collapse, however, several of the companies
and their financing partners have become insolvent or otherwise unable to complete their contracts
on schedule or at all. Most notable is the Hopewell project, which combined an MRT line to the
Don Muang Airport (Bangkok's main airport) with an additional overhead expressway, which has
completely collapsed despite significant construction being completed. Nevertheless, the first
MRT line is expected to open in 1999 and the government hopes, although they concede it is
optimistic, that the MRT system will be completed by 2001. At that time, it is estimated that the
system will provide 1.5 to 6 million passenger-trips per day 3 . (Khomnamool in SAE, 1998c,
p.49; Wanisubut, 1998a; Wanisubut, 1998b; Vongpivat, 1998a, p.56).
Public Perceptions and Observed Behavior
Finally, in light of the poor quality of the available public transportation services, it is clear
why people desire to own their own private motorcycle or car. However, there are other reasons
which prompt those who can afford a motor vehicle of their own to do so, in the words of the
BMA/MIT study:
"Public transportation is simply not a realistic alternative for anyone with access to a car.
The only people traveling by car are those who have no other choice...people perceive large
benefits in owning a private car: freedom and comfort...dramatic increase in accessibility to
social, recreational and economic opportunities... wider choice of residential and
employment locations... and status in the community which those who depend on buses do
not enjoy" (BMA DCP/MIT, 1996, p.2).
Finally in addition to this qualitative suggestion that it will be difficult to overcome the
psychological benefits of owning a vehicle a recent OCMRT study provides further confirmation:
"Once a [household has] its own car, they rarely go back to using public transport: the
proportion of work trips by public transport for the average household falls from 89
percent to 28 percent once a car is available" (OCMRT, 1997b).
4.1.2 Tradeoffs
As significant as Bangkok's congestion and mobility problems are, one must recognize that
the population is currently able to get to and from work while providing for their family to varying
degrees. Finding a solution which maintains this current level of mobility to the entire population,
especially the poor, in the present while vastly improving conditions in the future is complex to say
the least. Nevertheless, it is evident that Bangkok's mobility requirements are not and cannot be
met by a system which is exclusively based on motor vehicles. The current situation has severely
restricted the economy and greatly deteriorated the quality of life in Bangkok. For this reason, the
" Estimates of ridership vary widely depending on the source.
government must shift Bangkok's transportation infrastructure towards compact transportation
corridors with high-occupancy, high-efficiency forms of public transit and away from sprawling
roadways and interchanges used by low-occupancy, less efficient forms of transport such as the
motor vehicle. This is not to say that there should not be streets--rather streets must be maintained
but they should be used to fulfill those mobility demands which cannot be met by public transit,
such as the transport of goods and services throughout the economy as well as those individuals
and businesses who require high levels of mobility.
4.1.3 Future Demands & Opportunities
While it is very difficult to determine what the proper balance between public and private
infrastructures should be, it has been estimated that the extreme density which is common
throughout Asia's largest cities will require that 45% of all traffic volume be provided by public
transportation (Shafer and Victor, 1998, p.59). In light of Bangkok's 'superblocks' and the lack
of space available for roads, however, it is seems likely that Bangkok will need to provide an even
larger amount of public transportation than other Asian cities.
Accordingly, Bangkok should consider ways to further encourage private sector
participation in the provision of public transit with respect to both bus and mass transit systems.
This is especially true in light of the collapse of several of the MRT concession projects. In order
to speed the provision of public transit, the government must increase its willingness to
finance/subsidize these projects on a more equal basis. This is because the value of public transit
far exceeds that of the transport service alone. Rather public transit enables the roads to remain
free for commerce and high-mobility demands, rather than the alternative which exists today of
severe congestion, pollution, and tremendous direct, indirect, and opportunity costs for all
members of society. For this reason, the government must realize that pubic transit is highly
unlikely to ever be profitable based on fares alone. Rather, since its true economic value comes
overall increased mobility of passengers as well as the road network, its economic value is many
times larger than the fares alone. Accordingly, the government must be willing to finance or
provide larger subsidies to the private sector for improved bus and rapid transit service.
And as growth continues to be channeled away from Bangkok and toward satellite cities
and other rural areas, it is important that these areas have sufficient infrastructure planned and
possibly even constructed before substantial development occurs. Most important, however, is
that this infrastructure be chosen not necessarily to supply roads or to meet demand, but rather to
guide development into more sustainable urban forms. This necessarily requires that affordable
public and mass transit be planned from the outset along with a suitably designed road network. In
general, providing for multiple and high-density transportation alternatives will ensure that the
mobility needs of dense urban populations are met while the streets are able to convey commercial
vehicles vital to the economy as well as those personal automobiles which are needed to provide a
higher degree of mobility than is offered by the competing forms of transportation.
Unfortunately, providing improved transportation alternatives alone will not prompt people
to take public transportation rather than their car or motorcycle. Such a change in behavior will
only occur if people decide independently that taking public transportation is more convenient,
comfortable, or affordable than taking their personal vehicle. These are difficult standards to meet
given the comforts of today's cars. And this problem will become especially difficult if congestion
on the roads decreases thereby tempting people back into their cars.
For this reason, additional incentives need to be provided to people to encourage them to
willingly change their behavior and take public transportation even though it is unlikely to provide
the level of service and comfort that is inherent in an automobile. The easiest means of altering an
individual's decision is by increasing the cost of driving their personal vehicle. This can be done
through a variety of mechanisms, but more important than those increases is the rationale behind
them and how they change behavior.
First and foremost, increasing the cost of driving forces drivers to face a more accurate
reflection of the social costs of driving, where the social costs include contributing to congestion,
air emissions, road wear/consumption, the need to provide parking, and even the danger of
causing an accident to oneself or others). These are all worthwhile and important goals in and of
themselves. In addition, such an increase also encourages people to take public transit and freeing
the road space they would have otherwise occupied. In addition, the increased costs can go
towards subsidizing the costs of public transit which has already been shown to increase the value
of public roadways. Finally, specific means of imposing such costs include increased vehicle
taxes at time of purchase, increased fuel taxes, a parking tax on those who commute to work by car
and leave their car parked during the day, increased road tolls, and even congestion (time of
day/traffic level) pricing.
Each of these forms of tax accomplish all of the aforementioned concerns, but with
differing degrees of implementation. For this reason, Bangkok should consider which of these are
most suitable and able to be implemented in the Bangkok metropolitan region. No matter which of
these they choose, the results will be real and magnified by the fact that such incentives not only
raise revenue but they encourage more sustainable behavior while financing a more sustainable
infrastructure.
4.2 Air Quality, Emission Controls, & Fuels
The lack of mobility in Thailand has other impacts which go beyond the direct costs of lost
time and fuel. This is because the lack of mobility is linked in complex ways to many other
problems which have adverse impacts of their own. One of the most serious consequences of
congestion is the increased motor vehicle emissions which result from the slow speeds, dense
traffic, and added running time of the hundreds of thousands of low-occupancy motor vehicles.
These emissions have local, regional, and global effect which can all be mitigated through any
variety of emissions controls, fuel modification of substitutes, and the increased use of public
transportation.
4.2.1 Status Quo
4.2.1.1 Automobile Emissions & Air Quality
Unfortunately, the specific relationship between vehicle emissions and average traffic speed
is not currently known for Bangkok's vehicle fleet. This means that it is impossible to precisely
know the effect of congestion on emissions. However, Ellis & Stedman have constructed a
computer model which has found that carbon monoxide emissions vary non-linearly with declining
speed as shown in Figure 4.3. Specifically, as the average speed drops from 20 to 2 km/hour,
they estimate that emissions increase ten-fold (Ellis & Stedman, 1994, p.12). However, this
relationship was derived for a fixed number of vehicles whereas during congested conditions, the
number of cars in a given area is much larger than during faster speeds. For this reason, emissions
will be further increased beyond that reflected in Figure 4.3.
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Figure 4.3: Effect of Congestion on Automobile Emissions (Ellis & Stedman, 1994).
Next, this generalized relationship is likely to be conservative in that it does not account for
the characteristics of the Bangkok vehicle fleet which is generally perceived to be old and poorly
maintained. Ellis & Stedman in conjunction with other researchers have used the FEAT (Fuel
Efficiency Automobile Test) remote sensing technique to measure a variety of different pollutants
for vehicle fleets in several different Asian cities. In the case of Bangkok, the hydrocarbon
emission results revealed that Bangkok's fleet has high emissions throughout the entire distribution
unlike the observations made in Seoul, Hong Kong, and Taipeil 4 which revealed that the worst 5%
or 10% of the fleet is generally responsible for the bulk of the emissions. Unfortunately, the
results obtained in Bangkok must be viewed with mild skepticism because they were based on a
rather small sample size of 1,300 vehicles. Accordingly, this profile may not be representative of
the aggregate fleet, nevertheless it does suggest that highly polluting vehicles may be the norm
rather than the exception in Bangkok (Ellis & Stedman, 1994, p.4).
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Figure 4.4: International comparison of the distribution of hydrocarbon fleet emissions
(Ellis and Stedman, 1994).
Finally, it is useful to determine which portions of the vehicle fleet are most responsible for
each of the major pollutants. As presented earlier, in 1996, Bangkok had more than 3.5 million
14 Ellis & Stedman note that the testing locations used in Taipei were highways which did not allow motorcycles.
As a result, these measurments are not representative of the Taipei fleet (Ellis & Stedman, 1994).
registered vehicles including 1.5 million motorcycles, 1.0 million personal cars, 770 thousand
vans, 100 thousand trucks, 35 thousand buses and 100 thousand other taxis, tuk-tuks, and
miscellaneous vehicles. The Thai Pollution Control Department has determined the percent
contribution of four different vehicle categories for PM-10, carbon monoxide, hyrdrocarbon, and
oxides of nitrogen. These findings include absolute emissions and percent contributions and are
displayed in tabular form in Table 4.4 as well as in graphical form in Figure 4.5 through Figure
4.8. While the PCD study does not classify vehicles according to the convention used by the
Registry of Motor Vehicles, strong parallels exist, especially for small vehicles/passenger cars and
motorcycles (the later is common to both conventions) thereby making the statistics easy to
compare.
PM-10 CO HC NOx
Small Vehicles 74% 78% 64% 31%
Medium Vehicles 1% 1% 1% 7%
Large Vehicles 5% 2% 3% 61%
Motorcycles 20% 19% 32% 1%
Total Emissions 31,691 tons 2,313,556 tons 494,246 tons 134,249 tons
Table 4.4: 1994 Bangkok vehicle emissions characteristics (Suksod, 1998).
As the above data shows, the emissions of motorcycles and small vehicles (which together
represent 78% of the Bangkok fleet) when taken together represent the source of 94% of PM-10
emissions, 97% of carbon monoxide, and 96% of hydrocarbons. In addition, large, medium, and
small vehicles are responsible for 99% of NOx emissions. These findings are largely consistent
with the expectations that: 1) petrol/gasoline fueled four-stroke vehicles (primarily small vehicles)
produce CO and NOx; 2) diesel-fueled vehicles produce SPM, S02 and NOx; and 3) two-stroke
gasoline motorcycles' 5 , which are widely known to be much more polluting than four-stroke
automobilesl 6, produce SPM, HC, and CO (Wangwongwatana in SAE, 1998c, p. 11).
Taken as a whole, this data shows that Bangkok's air pollution is the direct result of the
tremendous number of highly-polluting motor vehicles which compete for limited road space. The
resulting congestion significantly worsens ambient air quality due to non-linearities in emissions as
well as vehicle density. These emissions are then introduced into Bangkok's 'street canyons'
where they expose the population and produce health effects which are known to vary non-linearly
with exposure.
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Figure 4.5: 1994 Bangkok vehicle PM-10 emissions (Suksod, 3/10/98).
15 Less than ten percent of existing motorcycles are estimated to be of the four-stroke variety (Wangwongwatana in
SAE, 1998b, p.11).
16 According to the World Bank, "The fuel economy of two-stroke engines is about half of that from four-stroke
engines. HC emissions from four stroke engine motorcycles are 12-15 times higher than emissions from 
new four-
stroke engine motorcycles and over 10 times higher than emissions from in-use cars" (Carbajo, 1992, p.5).
Percentage of CO Emissions (1994)
Bangkok Total=2,313,556 tons
Motorcycles
19
Large vehicles
2%
Medium vehicles
1%
I vehicles
78%
Figure 4.6: 1994 Bangkok vehicle CO Emissions (Suksod, 3/10/98).
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Figure 4.7: 1994 Bangkok vehicle HC Emissions (Suksod, 3/10/98).
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Figure 4.8: 1994 Bangkok vehicle NOx Emissions (Suksod, 3/10/98).
4.2.1.2 Greenhouse Gas Emissions & Global Climate Change
One of the products of the combustion of fossil fuels in motor vehicles is carbon dioxide.
Research has found that C02 and other 'greenhouse' gases are likely contributing to a complex
process of global climate change. If such change is underway, it is likely that the consequences
will be both severe and irreversible. For this reason many developed nations have, through the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, begun to consider how to avert such a
possibility and how various countries must reduce their greenhouse gas emissions if such change
is to be avoided or at least mitigated. At present, Thailand is thought to produce between 1 and 2%
of global greenhouse gases". However, because the UN FCCC members have currently decided
that developing countries do not have to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, Thailand does not need
to be overly concerned about its emissions of C02 and other greenhouse gases. However, this
could change as new evidence comes to light.
4.2.2 Tradeoffs
The widespread distribution of fleet emissions suggests that control measures must extend
over the entire Bangkok fleet rather than just new vehicles. However many of those who own
vehicles do so because they have no other means of getting to and from work. Accordingly, many
of them may just barely be able to afford their vehicles at present. Any additional costs to reduce
emissions may be exceptionally burdensome, especially in light of the economic crisis. For this
reason, preserving equity must be a primary concern as one determines how to reduce pollution.
Unfortunately the primary means for reducing the standard automobile pollutants as well as
greenhouse gases (C02) all entail added costs. These include repair and maintenance of the
vehicle, emissions control technologies, reformulated fuels, and alternative fuel vehicles. Repair
and maintenance obviously entails the costs of the necessary repairs which are likely to be
regressive towards the poor (e.g. the poor may have the largest repair bills) given that they have
the least money to devote to maintaining their vehicle.
With respect to emissions control technologies, there a number of such technologies
available for cars and trucks whether they run on petrol/gasoline or diesel. Technologies also exist
for both two- and four-cycle motorcycles. However, each of these technologies has an associated
cost as well, and the costs increase rapidly as the emissions reductions becomes larger.
Reformulated gasoline is another option by which to lower vehicle emissions. By reducing
the amount of impurities in the fuel many of the harmful byproducts can be reduced. The true
17 This information came from discussions within the National Automotive Strategies and Policies Group at the
Thailand Automotive Technology Workshop on April 1, 1998 in Bangkok.
benefit of reformulated fuels is that even a small percentage in emissions reduction is quickly
spread throughout the entire fleet which can lead to significant reductions in the aggregate.
However, these high-performance fuels work best in conjunction with high-performance engines
which are well maintained. Unfortunately, Thailand has neither of these and more importantly,
such fuels require additional processing which increases the cost of a fuel.
Lastly, alternative fuel vehicles provide an additional opportunity to reduce emissions
through the purchase of new vehicles or the conversion of old ones. While the necessary
technologies exist to make these vehicles possible, they too require added expense for the
conversion as well as more expensive fuels.
4.2.3 Future Demands & Opportunities
Because there are so many options available for reducing pollutants and yet none of them
meet the desire for equity, there are numerous opportunities for new and refined technologies as
well as creative financing mechanisms which can be used to finance them both.
In general, many of the technologies which exist for emissions reduction are fairly new and
still in the development stage. This is especially true for the new breeds of high-end catalysts
which are being mandated in the US and other developing countries. However, there are other
technologies which are just as advanced but have much lower marginal costs with respect to
emissions reductions. One example is the 'tube' type catalyst for two-stroke motorcycles. As a
Press Release from Degussa AG states "A Degussa Hot Tube@ catalyst attached to the customer's
motorcycle, for less than 1% of the total current motorbike sales price, will enable that bike to have
more than 60% cleaner emissions" (Degussa AG, 1998). Also available as a retrofit technology,
this type of technology is currently under development by numerous companies including several
in Thailand (Bickle, 1998). As such, if the government were to work with industry to promote not
just research and development, but also the deployment of such technology (through incentives or
subsidies) within Thailand not only would Thailand benefit from cleaner air but the technology
could be demonstrated as a dramatic success. Accordingly, based on such experiences Thai
industry would be better able to compete in the markets for such technology throughout Southeast
Asia.
Of all of the options Thailand has regarding emissions reduction, alternative fuel vehicles
are one of the most intriguing. While several functional and demonstrated technologies currently
exist, the fuels are simply too expensive relative to fossil fuels to justify their use. In medium- to
long-term, however, the cost of fossil fuels are expected to rise as global petroleum reserves begin
to decrease. For this reason Thailand has the opportunity to begin further refining technologies
which utilize resources which already exist in Thailand (as opposed to oil which is completely
imported). These domestic energy sources include natural gas and the biomass which is left
behind from the countries massive rice crop.
While these technologies are not currently viable, they are destined to become so as new
and improved technologies lower the costs of using these fuels and the cost of petroleum begins to
increase some time in the future. For this reason, the government currently has the opportunity to
work with industry to bring about research, development, and deployment of viable alternative fuel
vehicles today so that in the near future it can sell such vehicles to the many dense urban areas
throughout Southeast Asia. In other words, Thailand has the opportunity to use its automotive
industry base to advance to the next level of automotive technology and be the regional leader.
Finally, returning to the issue of greenhouse gases, in light of the fact that Thailand will
eventually need to reduce its C02 emissions, it would be prudent for Thailand to encourage the use
of low-carbon intensive technologies when the difference in cost is small.
4.3 Public Health
4.3.1 Status Quo
In general, there is very little information regarding the state of public health in Thailand,
and what little information does exists suffers from severe under-reporting. This is largely the
result of the low wage rate which that many people cannot afford health care, and as a result the
quality of their health is never known. As wages continue to rise, however, health care will
become more common and more data will be available. In the meantime, it is clear that the poor air
quality in Bangkok is having adverse impacts on quality of life, worker productivity, worker
health, and it is causing elevated morbidity and mortality, not to mention increased frustration and
poor mental health. Each of these effects has direct and indirect economic costs, some of which
accrue to the employer (e.g. lost time and productivity) while others accrue to the individual (e.g.
decreased quality of life, costs of medical treatment, shorter life span).
Once again, in light of the paucity of the data, it is very difficult to approximate the
economic losses which occur as a result of diminished public health due to air pollution, however,
this does not mean that the costs are not significant. Much of what is known about the state of
health in Thailand has been discussed in greater detail in Section 3.2.2. However, one additional
study which sheds light on the possible magnitude of Bangkok's losses was based on Mexico City
which has been deemed to have comparable air quality to Bangkok by Ellis & Stedman (Ellis and
Stedman, 1994, p.6). This health study found that in Mexico City, "economic damages due to the
health impacts of air pollution are estimated at $1.5 billion per year. Particulates are estimated to
cause 12,500 extra deaths and 11.2 million lost workdays per year, both due to respiratory illness"
(WRI et al, 1996, p.24). While Bangkok's population is less than half of Mexico City's and it has
roughly one-third of the cars, this study shows that failing to protect the public health, while not
only impinging on one's right to live a healthy life, is also extremely costly-- and it only becomes
more so as wages rise.
4.3.2 Tradeoffs
Once again, similar to the tradeoff discussed in Chapter 2, failing to protect the public
health is in part due to the conception that such protection is too costly and would have negative
impacts on the economic growth. While it is possible and indeed likely that at very low wage rates
it is 'economically efficient' not to protect the public health, this oversimplication of the
relationship between economic development and public health becomes increasingly costly as
wages rise. For this reason, once an economy experiences significant economic development and
wage increases, human resources become more valuable than material resources. Once this
occurs, it become both cost-effective and economically efficient to invest in protecting the public
health. Of course this entire discussion regarding the cost-effective and economically efficient
protection of the public health becomes a secondary issue if a country decides that all humans are
entitled to a clean environment and good health. Practically, however, such idealistic statements
are never enforced, especially until society places long-term health concerns over much shorter-
term concerns such as the adequate provision of food, clothing and shelter.
4.3.3 Future Demands & Opportunities
As Thailand continues to develop it wages and quality of life are likely to continue to
increase. As a result, continuing to neglect the public health will get progressively more costly to
business, individual citizens, and the national economy as a whole. For this reason Thailand needs
to begin investing in improving public health through improved urban air quality in Bangkok and
other urbanizing areas. While these changes will have clearly measurable direct costs for both
business and consumers, provided such changes are soundly based, they will result in net gains in
the economy rather than a loss.
4.4 Economic Development & the Automobile Industry
4.4.1 Status Quo
In 1961 the Thailand's 1st National Economic & Social Development Plan identified the
automobile industry as critical to Thailand's economic and social development. Over the last 37
years the government has maintained that position and become increasingly committed to globally
competitive free trade. This long history of wanting to attract and work with the automotive
industry is most likely largely motivated by the tremendous economic (and resultant social) benefits
that a strong automobile industry can provide.
For example, the top US-based automobile companies are the largest industrial companies
in the US, they have revenues in excess of $100 billion dollars, and they routinely invest billions
of dollars annually into research and development. In addition, when the large global automobile
manufacturers invest in a new facility, their investments are usually quite substantial ranging from
several hundred million US dollars to over one billion. Such investments can provide thousands
of jobs to any country during initial construction and subsequent operation, thereby significantly
contribute to improving the local and national quality of life. And once in place, these companies
diffuse and transfer numerous high-technologies and skills to both the work force and the
economy. In addition, since the automobile industry is typically a long-term commitment, these
companies are willing to invest in the long-term, continuous education of their employees. For all
of these reasons it is clear that the automobile industry has a great deal to offer Thailand.
Fortunately for Thailand, its favorable business conditions, low wage rates and land costs,
as well as its demonstrated commitment to the industry have won it significant investments from
global automobile manufacturers. Most recently, between 1993 and early 1998, Japanese, US,
and European automobile makers have invested US $7 billion in Thailand (The Nation, 2/27/98).
For this reason, Thailand is very well positioned for future demand growth in both automotive
parts and automobiles for all of Asia. And as the government continues to lower import and export
duties in accordance with international and regional agreements Thailand's competitiveness should
continue to increase.
4.4.2 Tradeoffs
As mutually beneficial as the relationship between Thailand and the automobile companies
sounds, however, there are additional issues which each side needs to be addressed in the medium-
to long-term. One such need is that of increased roadway infrastructures throughout Thailand. As
demonstrated earlier in this thesis, Thailand has a severe shortage of roads both in Bangkok and
throughout the entire country. Until Thailand has a roadway infrastructure which allows motor
vehicles to travel efficiently and reliably over long-distances the demand for automobiles will not
be realized.
Another need is education. While Thailand's wage rates are low, the supply of workers is
large. As a result, there is a high turnover of factory employees which means that worker training
becomes a very high priority for the industry. For this reason, Toyota has already invested in a
US $20M in a training center north of Bangkok. Similarly, Thailand's lack of a highly-educated
work force means that the automobile companies will need to invest significantly in the education
of their management staff.
As this thesis has demonstrated, the air pollution problems in Thailand are both severe and
costly. However, even as alternatives to motor vehicle transport become available, it is almost
certain that as the quality of life rises, Thais will want cleaner air even as congestion related
emissions hopefully decrease. For this reason, one can anticipate that government regulations will
require industry to install additional emissions control equipment which will increase vehicle prices
possibly hurting competition.
Finally, another concern for industry regards how Thailand sets its regulatory standards
(emissions control and otherwise) relative to other countries to which Thai industry hopes to
export. If Thailand adopts regulations different from potential trading partners or vice-versa, Thai
industry will be required to produce additional models for each market rather than one for all. This
will result in increased prices for all and decreased competitiveness for Thai industry. For this
reason, regional or global harmonization of standards is of great concern to both industry and
government. Clearly the domestic automobile industry and its global competitiveness has a
significant amount at stake in regard to how such standards are set. As a result, Thailand needs to
balance its environmental and safety regulations against those of its neighbors so that it does not
impose significant costs on its export-minded, domestic industry.
4.4.3 Future Demands & Opportunities
While several of the tradeoffs identified above appear to put industry and government at
odds along the narrow dimensions presented, there are opportunities where each could work with
the other for mutual gains.
First and foremost is the need for improved infrastructure for automobiles. However, as
this thesis has demonstrated, increasing the quantity or otherwise improving the quality of roads is
not a sustainable solution for Bangkok or other urban and developing areas. While automobiles
play an important role within dense urban areas, they cannot be the exclusive form of
transportation. For this reason, facilitating the development, construction, and operation of
integrated, multi-modal transportation systems composed of automobiles, buses, mass rapid
transit, light-rail systems and boats is in the best interests of both the automobile industry and
government.
Furthermore, Asia represents a huge potential market, but it is becoming increasingly
urban. This suggests that Bangkok's problems will be repeated numerous times in the future. If
industry and government are to provide the mobility necessary for a growing economy in Bangkok
and elsewhere, they need to work cooperatively and use all of their collective resources to ensure
that efficient transportation is available to all, even though that necessarily means that automobiles
will contribute less to transportation than they otherwise would.
A second opportunity for mutual gain arises from the low degree of education which exists
in the Thai labor market. Before industry can employ many of its future workers it realizes it must
invest in their education at the factory, manager, and engineer levels. Such general and specific
education of the work force is clearly in the interests of the government in that it increases the skill
set of workers and therefore their potential for higher paying jobs and a stronger economy and
quality of life. For this reason, government should work with industry to find ways of
cooperatively investing in and providing financial incentives for such investments.
Next, Bangkok's severe pollution problems require that it act to reduce vehicle emissions.
While there are many ways to do this, it is important that these actions not restrict the domestic
industry's ability to export goods to other regions. This suggests that it would be in the interests
of both government and industry to push for the adoption of reasonable harmonized standards'8 .
In addition, the government needs to consider the possibility of accepting standards which
are not as stringent as it would like in order to facilitate the export of automobiles to other countries
which have less stringent emission control standards. This, however, suggests a complementary
action on behalf of industry to work with government to find additional ways of pursuing the goals
of emissions reduction through other approaches including market incentives/mechanisms (e.g.
fuel tax), improved public transportation, and improved land-use planning which is more
compatible with urban development and sustainable automobile use (See Section 4.1.3).
8 'Reasonable' refers to the need to moderate harmonized standards by ensuring that the marginal costs required by
such standards are comparable of those to the market the vehicle is being sold in. For example, the marginal cost of
near zero-emission control technology is not justified in a market such as Bangkok's where such reductions can be
obtained through other means at much lower marginal cost.
4.5 Government Institutions & Capacity
4.5.1 Status Quo
In response to Bangkok's growing mobility problems, in 1992 the 7th National Plan
increased the budget allocation for transportation related agencies by 680%. This represented an
increase in the five-year budget from 43 billion Baht to more than 335 billion Baht. In addition,
the 8th National Plan has further increased this to 528 billion Baht (Vongpivat, 1998a, p.23-24).
As a result of these unprecedented increases, numerous agencies which had previously
been struggling to maintain their budgets much less grow, responded enthusiastically by
submitting mobility related proposals to the Cabinet for funding. All in all, eleven organizations
applied for national funding: eight government services and four state enterprises which together
spanned three different ministries. These agencies and their respective ministries are as follows
(Vongpivat, 1998a, p.24-25):
Ministry of the Interior:
* Police Department
* Department of Public Works
* Office of City Planning
* Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority of Thailand (ETA)
Ministry of Transport & Communication:
* Department of Land Transportation
* Department of State Highways
* Railway Authority of Thailand
* Bangkok Mass Transit Authority
Office of the Prime Minister:
* Office of the Commission for the Management of Road Traffic
* Office of the Committee for National, Social, and Economic Development
* Bangkok Rail Transit Authority.
As this list and especially its shear number of government related organizations suggests,
Thailand lacks a centralized agency or authority which is responsible for coordinating and ensuring
integrated, cooperative services between the numerous transportation modes and services. As a
result, it is almost certain that efforts are duplicated throughout the agencies but more disturbing is
that the substantial budgets being devoted to solving Bangkok's mobility problems are not being
coordinated and therefore not having the maximum effect (Vongpivat, 1998a, p.52). In fact,
individual projects could be conflicting with each other and creating new problems.
4.5.2 Tradeoffs
Based on this assessment the need for clarifying government responsibilities is clear. At
present there is no lead institution whose role is to coordinate the others. In addition, there is
undoubtedly repetition of services or mis-allocation of responsibilities within these eleven
organizations. For this reason, clarifying roles and consolidating services and responsibilities
would be highly-beneficial. However, such reorganization are always disruptive in the near-term,
especially given that they could potentially span three different ministries. For this reason, the
degree of disruption needs to be weighed against the possible gains in efficiency of services.
4.5.3 Future Demands & Opportunities
Despite the difficulties which are posed by this decentralization of power, improving
communication and cooperation between agencies as well as providing a single organization to act
as the lead integrating agency for transportation and mobility issues could result in vastly
improved services provided the reorganization was orchestrated by strong leaders with well
supported goals and feasible tactics. In light of extreme lack of success in improving
transportation and mobility, however, a well integrated strategy for improving mobility within
Bangkok could very well provide an excellent opportunity to reorganize and provide the public
with much enhanced transportation services. Gaining such support is especially true given that the
first Mass Rapid Transit line will begin operation in 1999 and will hopefully provide the first
positive improvement in mobility the population has seen in many years.
5. A Proposed Integrated National Strategy
The following recommendations provide a strong foundation for a new integrated, national
strategy for balancing the economic development potential of the automotive industry against the
urban environmental problems of air pollution and traffic congestion.
*Mobility to should be provided for all socioeconomic groups.
*Govemment should focus be on moving people and not vehicles (Vongpivat, 1998a).
*Encourage private sector participation in the provision of public transportation (both bus and rapid
transit).
*Increase the usage of public mass transit in Bangkok through a vastly improved bus system
which includes additional designated bus lanes and additional, and cleaner buses.
*Increase government willingness to subsidize mass rapid transit.
*Use infrastructure to guide development into sustainable urban forms (including both mass transit
and roads).
*Increase the cost of driving by appropriate taxes to maker mass transit more attractive, reduce
externalities of private automobile use, raise revenues for public transit.
*All vehicles should well maintained over the course of their life to ensure low emissions.
*Encourage further development of two-stroke motorcycle catalyst technology and industry.
*Encourage alternative fuel vehicle research.
*Provide safe ambient air quality throughout all of Thailand.
*Do not adopt excessively stringent emissions standards.
*Promote cooperative educational ventures between industry and government.
*Encourage the harmonization of regional and global standards.
*Designate a centralized transportation authority for coordinating all other related agencies.
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